The Collapse of the Confederacy

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It is customary to account for the collapse of the Confederacy in the War, 1861-1865, on the basis of the preponderant resources in men and materials, and through the superior military, financial and industrial organizations of the North. It has been asserted that the Confederacy might have continued the contest but for the superior organization of the Northern Armies, as shown in Grant’s Campaign in Virginia, Thomas’s victories in Tennessee, Sheridan’s devastation in the Shenandoah, Sherman’s march through Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina, and the blockade. The resources of the two sections have been compared, statistics of the wealth and population have been used to show the superiority of the northern section. Finally, this rather traditional treatment of the War has ended with the astonishing conclusion that we must all be amazed that the Confederacy was able to continue the contest for so long a period. On the contrary, it is astonishing that, with its resources, the Confederacy did not continue the War for a longer period. Here was a nation with a large territory and enormous resources suddenly collapsing. How is it to

* In the preparation and completion of this study, I am under deep obligations to Professor Edward Channing, who has directed and encouraged my efforts in this field of research. The materials upon which the Monograph is based were used in the presentation of the investigation as a Seminary study at Harvard University.

1 Judge Graham Taylor, quoting Charles Francis Adams, on the occasion of the celebration of the birth of General Robert E. Lee, made the following statements: "How was the wholly unexpected outcome brought about? The simple answer is, the Confederacy collapsed from inanition. Suffering such occasional reverses and defeats as are incidental to all warfare, it was never crushed in battle or on the field until its strength was sapped away from want of food. It died of exhaustion, starved and gasping."—Bulletin of William and Mary College, Vol. IV, No. 3, p. 12.

"Every State was exhausted and without food. In the entire Confederacy there were meat rations barely sufficient for the army for a period of twenty-five days, and the winter (1864) had just begun." The History of North America, Guy Carleton Lee, Ed. Vol. XIV. The Civil War from a Southern Viewpoint. W. R. Garret and R. A. Halley.

"The Confederacy failed not because it was defeated in the field, but because it was starved and crushed into submission." Max Farrand, The Development of the United States, pp. 230. Cf. Woodrow Wilson, History of the American People, Vol. VIII, Chap. II. James F. Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, Vol. V, Chap. XXVIII.
be explained in any other way than on the basis of military organization? Quite evidently, the military campaigns of the North, its superior industrial organization and large resources had great effect upon the result of the contest. But these conclusions cannot completely explain the result. No treatment of the Civil War will be complete until the disintegrating internal factors have been exploited. The psychological factors which enter into the disruption of southern morale and the inherent political weaknesses of southern war times are fundamental, for in the long run these must determine the resistance.

The South collapsed, it is asserted, because of the lack of men, food, war materials and resources for its population. These factors should be carefully studied before we can determine whether these factors were directly responsible, or whether behind these there were more potent forces. The lack of material resources did occasion suffering in the South, especially during 1865. This must be admitted. But no nation in history has gained its independence or the freedom to follow its chosen pursuits, without suffering, and without drinking the dregs of the bitter cup of adversity. The wars of independence in the modern world have been fought, as a rule, by peoples of inferior resources and populations. Note the war of Netherlands with Spain at the dawn of the modern era, in which thousands were butchered in the Spanish Fury and their country inundated, but the Dutch were not beaten; the wars of Frederick the Great, in which Prussia was drained of men and boys by conscription, even Berlin, the Capital, was captured and the country overrun, but Prussia was not beaten, and did not collapse in spite of the odds against her. The American Revolution, the Spanish uprising against the Napoleonic invaders—these and more show clearly that more important than numbers and resources—as weighty as they may be in the final result—are the morale of the people and their attitudes toward the war. The war lesson of modern history seems to teach that a nation like an individual is not beaten until its spirit is broken.

The Earl of Chatham expresses the thought most clearly when he said—"Conquer a free population of three million souls? The thing is impossible!" Morale was just as fundamental a factor in the Civil War. While there was a lack of food in the army and in certain military areas, there was food in abundance in other parts of the South. While there was an insufficient supply of munitions and the implements of war, yet there were army supplies to be burned and destroyed at Richmond, Atlanta, Savannah, Charleston, Fayetteville, Columbia and other places until around March, 1865. While there was an inadequate railroad system, yet there were railroads, there was some railroad building, there were repairs to roads, cars were built, there were wagons and horses, foundries and mills. Truly, as in other wars, the nation denying the right of independence was superior in all, but the people who were seeking independence seemed
powerless to use the nucleus given them for the building of greater resistance.

The study which follows will be divided into three parts, (1) to determine whether there were sufficient resources in the South for the conduct of the war, and how long these resources were available; (2) how far were internal dissensions and the lack of the spirit of cooperation responsible for the collapse; and finally, (3) was the morale of the Confederacy, in any measure, responsible for the collapse. With the military events constantly in mind, the determination of the importance of these factors—and especially the last which is psychological and to some extent indefinite—will assist a more comprehensive treatment of our Civil War Period.

I. THE RESOURCES OF THE CONFEDERACY.

Food. The land of the South is rich in the possibilities of production. In the variety of its natural food production, the South was more than equal to the North. But in the South the tillage was rude and primitive, and it was carried on by slave-labor. In the North, the improved processes of machinery made possible a large production in proportion to the number of laborers employed. In the lower states of the South land was easily tillable. The seasons are long, so that two or three crops of vegetables are raised in a year.

The cotton crop of 1860 amounted to 4,861,000 bales, and in 1861, it consisted of 3,849,000 bales. The advice of the press, agreements of planters’ conventions, the appeals of governors, the resolutions of legislatures, a joint resolution of Congress and an appeal from President Davis encouraged the substitution of food stuffs for cotton. A decline in the production of cotton followed. It continued through 1862 and 1863; in 1861, the crop was only one-eighth as large as the crop of 1861, and the harvest of cereals and food was larger. Travelers tell of the condition of the food production. W. Carsen, an English merchant, in 1862, tells of the excellent dinners of cold fowl, baked opossum, apples, cracked

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3 The Richmond Examiner, March 19, 1862, regarded the production of another large cotton crop not only as a peril to “our country and cause by famine, but would prejudice the interest of the cotton planters themselves in cheapening the cotton product.” The results of these efforts to reduce cotton production is noted by Governor Vance. Off. Reds. Rebell. Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 181. Two months in New Orleans and the Southern States, pp. 67.
corn and sweet cake, which he found for sale at various stations along his route. He admits, however, that owing to the blocking up of the railroads with troops, food scarcity in the markets resulted. After six weeks of travel, he finally concluded that "the South cannot be starved out * * * and any notion that the South is now dependent on any outside people for food is a fallacy and may as well be given up." Concerning the army, he states, that "in the matter of food, the troops of the army of the Southern Mississippi were at least as well off in time of war as in peace." 5

In some places in 1863, there was actual hardship from the want of food. Jonathan Worth, a prominent citizen of North Carolina, at one time Treasurer and later Governor, wrote to a friend, January 5, "all well but on the verge of starvation," and later, "we are almost starved out." 6 Governor Vance, of the same state, informed Secretary Seddon of the War Department that, in the interior of the state, "there was much suffering for bread, already, and will be more on account of the failure of crops from drought." 7 The crop of this year was short. Georgia had planted a large amount of corn but on account of drought the return was not as estimated at first. 8 In January, President Davis wrote Governor Brown of Georgia that, "the possibility of a short supply of provisions presents the greatest danger to a successful prosecution of the war." 9 In other parts of the South, there were crop failures during 1863, which were very depressing in their effects. 10 During 1861 and 1863 the letters of General Beauregard show a want of subsistence. In 1861 he complains that some of his regiments had nothing to eat for more than twenty-four hours, and that military movements were impossible because only one wagon and four horses were assigned to every hundred men. 11 Across the Mississippi, supplies seemed to be plentiful. Major Lockett of the Commissary Department, after a journey through Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, tells of the quantities of cattle grazing near the roads, and of the flocks which "might be used in furnishing supplies to the troops in this department." 12 It was said also, that "the crops and gardens, and orchards yielded plenti-

5 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
6 Jonathan Worth, Correspondence, I, pp. 222, 227.
8 Ibid., pp. 404.
9 Ibid., pp. 376.
10 A report of Secretary Seddon, January 3, 1863, stated "the harvests of the past season have not generally proved propitious, and notwithstanding the much larger breadth of land devoted to the culture of cereals and forage, the product in many extended districts of the Confederacy is below the average, and in some threatens scarcity." Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 292.
11 August 22, 1861, General Beauregard wrote, "the want of food and transportation has made us lose all the fruits of our victory." Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, I, pp. 120, 179, 208.
fully and that all kinds of poultry thrived in Mississippi." 13 Florida had an abundant crop in 1862.14

As the year 1863 advanced, hopes were high for an abundant harvest and plentiful supplies. A traveler along the Danville Railroad in Virginia wrote to the Richmond Examiner that "fields of wheat were most promising," that "on either side of the railroad, the golden-colored areas are spread out in all their beauty." The writer was informed that, "such a wheat crop had not been garnered for a quarter of a century, and that such was the expectations of farmers everywhere." 15 Governor Brown of Georgia wrote to President Davis, that there were many wild cattle in lower Georgia and Florida.16 General Sherman wrote to his brother, that there was plenty in Texas and in other parts, and "we have found everywhere abundant supplies, even on the Yazoo, and all along the river we found cattle and fat ones feeding quietly. The country abounds in corn." 17 Dana wrote Secretary Stanton at Washington, May 4, 1863, that "beef, cattle and corn are both abundant everywhere. The enemy is not suffering for want in the least." 18

In spite of these reports, the city markets continued to show a scarcity. There was famine in the midst of plenty. The urban population, and in some cases, the army was suffering from the want of food, while there was an abundance in the country districts. The newspapers raised constant complaints against the farmers who would not sell their products and who were said to be holding their food for better prices. Others upheld the farmers and said that they were suffering from the deranged currency, impressments and the taxes in kind. These were burdens to the farmers and they produced continued dissatisfaction.19

In January, 1864, General Maury wrote to General Polk that there was plenty of meat being cured in Alabama, and that some beef cattle was awaiting his call.20 In the same year, General J. K. Jackson of Florida estimated that Florida would produce annually 25,000 heads of beeves, equal to 10,000,000 pounds, 1,000,000 pounds of bacon, and 1,000 hogshead of sugar, fruits and other provisions.21 In Mississippi, there was an abun-
dance even after supplying the requisitions of the army up to 1864, when
the removal of slaves, the impressment of horses and mules and the
invasions of the state produced an apparent exhaustion. The diaries and
memoirs of soldiers mention days of scarcity in the early part of 1864, but
says Jones, in the Surrey Light Artillery, "as the fall and winter of 1864
approached and the tax-in-kind began to be collected, the supplies furnished
the army became more liberal and in greater variety." General Northrop, of the Bureau of Subsistence, in a report, December, 1861, to Secretary Seddon, wrote that there had been no complaint or suffering from defect of subsistence in any armies outside of Virginia, "the territories from which they draw having been unbesieged by the enemy." He added that there was then in Richmond or en route only twenty-five days' rations for 100,000 men. But when the paymaster came around Camp Henrico, Virginia, and gave the soldiers four months' pay, the hucksters appeared with "pies and things," and retail vendors of things to eat plied a large trade. In the newspapers there were advertisements during 1863, 1864, 1865 of hundreds of instances of the sale of groceries and foods. The auction sales were very frequent.

There were speculators who drove prices higher and made food more scarce. In August, 1862, the Governor of Florida wrote to the Florida delegation at Richmond urging them to take steps to meet the nefarious smuggling of speculators who charged extortionate prices. Governor Vance, of North Carolina, in September, proposed a state convention to fix prices, and by proclamation he forbade the export of provisions from the state, in order to prevent the seeking of higher prices in other markets. President Davis wrote to other governors urging price fixing by the states as a remedy against speculators. Sermons were preached against the "godless Shylocks," as they were called. The Governor of Virginia beseeched the unpatriotic extortioner who found the war a blessing. In January, 1865, a rumor was spread in Richmond that the Secretary of War was appointing men to hunt up speculators, and Jones, the War Clerk, in his diary, says that the Jews and others were busy with their hand-carts and wheelbarrows, removing barrels of flour from the center of the town to the outskirts of the city, being fearful of impressments.

In the same month, General Lee wrote to Secretary Seddon, that the country was swept clear, and that his army had only two days' supply. General Northrop stated that General Lee's army might be provisioned from southwestern Virginia, where there were 100,000 bushels of corn

22 Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Centenary Series II, pp. 204.
23 Jones, Surrey Light Artillery, pp. 299.
26 Stephenson, The Day of the Confederacy, pp. 78.
27 Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, pp. 387.
and a great deal of meat, but he added that three things were necessary, funds, wagon transportation and the cooperation of the people. In some manner this need for General Lee’s army was met, for later General Lee reported that the crisis of starvation in the army was passed. In March, 1865, General Longstreet reported to General Lee that there were large quantities of provisions in North Carolina—“a two or three year supply.” He urged the seizure of the gold at Richmond in order to purchase food, as the people would take the gold but not the Confederate Currency. From Alabama, the report came that “the new bacon crop” would be large but that it could not be controlled without funds. Additional evidence on this point is shown in a dispatch, March 10, 1865, by Major French to General I. M. St. John of the Bureau of Subsistence, in which it is said that the crops south of North Carolina, in Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi were never so large, that with railroad communications restored and with “gold or United States Currency to operate in sections where Confederate money is not acceptable,” the estimate for the year could be doubled. From North Carolina and Virginia, he could secure 12,500,000 rations of bread and 11,500,000 rations of meat; and from East Tennessee 15,000,000 rations of bread and 5,000,000 rations of meat additional. Colonel Williams, of the Subsistence Department, sent a report of the same date that quantities of supplies were available in East Tennessee and Virginia. He concluded that the question of feeding the army depended upon “a judicious management of transportation and the control of one-half a million of dollars in coin, together with $150,000 per day in Treasury notes.” In a subsequent report he stated that the combined exertions of the officers and the Commissary, during the month of March and up to the first of April, 1865, kept all the sub-depots on the lines of railroads in Virginia nearly always full.

Major Claiborne, of the same department, wrote that there is a most ample supply to sustain our armies—to obtain them was the only question presented to the department. “Energetic action in transportation,” he continued, “and earnest efforts in the collection of supplies will avail much but the officers must be supplied with means * * * the hoarders are surfeited with paper money, and these stores can be obtained only by the use of gold or the bayonets of the enemy.” General Sherman, at the beginning of his March to the Sea wrote that his soldiers “liked pigs, sheep,
chickens, calves and sweet potatoes better than rations. We won't starve in Georgia." At the conclusion of his march he wrote, "We came right along living on turkeys, chickens, pigs, bringing our wagons loaded, as we started, with bread." General Sheridan in his official report of his raid to the James River says, that he found "provisions for man and beast in great abundance all along his march." The Richmond Examiner of March 27, 1865, adds the comment that "this is a beautiful commentary upon the liberality and policy of our people—when General Lee calls for provisions to feed his army we are told that this man and that have given them all, but when the Yankee raiders come along, they find meat houses and corn cribs or cellars filled with abundance." By April 1, 1865, there was collected the following amount by the Confederate Commissary:

At Richmond, Va., 300,000 rations of bread and meat.
At Danville, Va., 500,000 rations of bread.
At Danville, Va., 1,500,000 rations of meat.
At Lynchburg, Va., 180,000 rations of bread and meat.
At Greensboro, N. C., and vicinity, 1,500,000 rations of bread and meat.

These collections did not include forage by field trains of the armies under orders from their own headquarters, nor the depot collections at Charlottesville, Staunton and other points. At the time of the evacuation of Richmond, Major Claiborne estimated that there were 400,000 rations of bread and meat. These were sent out by railroad and wagon transportation, the residue was "distributed or appropriated by the people of Richmond." A few days after the evacuation, Mr. Breckinridge, Secretary of War, reported that General St. John had asked General Lee where he should locate a large quantity of rations which he had secured; the reply of General Lee was that the military situation made it impossible to answer. Colonel T. G. Williams, Assistant Commissary General, reported that during the month of March, and up to the first of April the depots were full. In the early part of 1865, the country had recovered rapidly from Sherman's March, and we are told that in Georgia "the fields were tilled, the crops were growing, but people were still short of provisions and that no one wants to take Confederate money." General Joseph E. Johnston stated that in February, 1865, rations for sixty thou-

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35 Sherman Home Letters, pp. 313-316.
36 Richmond Examiner, March 27, 1865; March 25, 1865.
38 Ibid., pp. 106-107.
39 Ibid., 104-105.
40 Ibid., pp. 106.
41 Andrews, Diary of a Georgia Girl, pp. 167.
sand men for more than four months were stored in the principal depots between Charlotte, Danville and Weldon, and that before April 20, more than 700,000 rations had been collected in various depots between Charlotte, N. C., and Washington, Georgia, "in a district that had been thought destitute." The Commissary was not always efficient in its collection and storage of food. Frequent reference is made to depots of provisions being neglected, to quantities of corn, wheat, bacon and potatoes which go to waste and "are either lost or stolen through the carelessness of railroads and transportation companies."

From the above, it would seem clear that there was some food in the Confederacy to the end of the war. It is certain also that there was some privation and suffering on the part of both the army and the people. There was food in plenty in parts of the South during all the years of the war and there was scarcity in all the years. The situation grew more acute as the war continued, but there is no evidence to show that the food situation became so alarming in 1865 that it,—per se,—produced the collapse. There was abundance of food in 1865, not only in the lower South but in the very areas in which the armies were operating. The army was upon a short allowance of food in the first year of the war and in the last year of the war. But in the country there was really no lack of supplies. The fault for the shortage may be discovered either in the inefficiency or inexperience—and probably both—of the Commissary Department, and in lack of adequate means for equitable distribution. Quantities of foodstuffs were raised in the South, but the army and city dwellers did not receive it. When Mrs. Chesnut left Richmond for Kingsville, S. C., in 1865, she found "creature comforts of all kinds—green peas, strawberries, asparagus, spring lamb, spring chicken, fresh eggs, rich yellow butter, clean white linen for one's bed, dazzling white damask for one's table." She concluded "it is such a contrast to Richmond, where I live." The problem of food supply, aside from military interference, was one of distribution. If the railroads had been properly utilized and replaced when worn, or if wagon transportation had been supplied, and if those areas which had supplies, had been willing to divide with those areas which had not, the food problem would not have been so acute. But one cannot imagine the Confederacy—a slave-holding regime, based on states rights and individualistic doc-

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43 Watson, Life in the Confederate Army, pp. 372.
44 Brigadier-General E. P. Alexander of the Confederate Army, writing in the Century Magazine, No. 31, pp. 629, states that "times were often hard in the field and camp, but this cut little figure when the trial of battle was on, and we never lost a field that I know of, for lack of food, clothing, ammunition, or anything that money might buy."
45 Chesnut, Dairy, pp. 308.
trines—maintaining any other ground than that which its history reveals. Other action was inherently impossible.

War Supplies and Manufacture. During the decade, 1850-1860, the South was undergoing an economic renaissance. It was rapidly turning from an agricultural to an industrial economy. Manufacturing increased rapidly, and if the war had not come, it seems safe to conjecture that the South would have developed an industrial life in spite of itself. During the war the South was inadequately supplied with war materials, and it was seriously handicapped by this scarcity. Before the war, all manufactured products had come from the North and the beginning of hostilities cut off this supply and forced upon the South the establishment of a variety of industries.

The supply of arms was obtained from three sources, (1) from the arsenals and armories of the United States which were seized by the Confederates at the outbreak of the war, and from the defeated armies of the Union; (2) from the manufacturing plants, public and private, which were established during the war, and (3) through the Blockade. Seizures of large quantities of arms were made at the opening of the war, and besides these, the Memphis Appeal states that there were 5,000,000 private arms which could be used for all practical purposes. It is a well known fact that every southern master had his gun, which was used for hunting and as a protection. Many such arms were old flint locks, which after alteration were almost worthless. The armies of the South went forth with "single and double barreled shotguns, squirrel rifles, muskets, flint locks and old pistols." Small arms factories were established in the lower South, especially in Alabama. Sea-coast and siege guns were made at the Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond. So successful were these operations that in 1863, General Gorgas could write that the army on this side of the Mississippi was adequately supplied and possessed artillery quite equal to that of the enemy. In November, 1863, it was reported that the supply of arms was steadily increasing. The armories at Richmond, Fayetteville and Asheville had produced about 28,000 small arms during the year. Private establishments had increased this number to 35,000, and it was estimated that 50,000 would be made by the year ending September 30, 1864.

50 But at the end of the year, his report showed that about 20,000 were made instead of 50,000; it was added, however, that 20,000 were on the way from Europe. Secretary Seddon reported in 1862 that arms of approved kinds were being made with more facility, at more places and in larger numbers than at any previous time. Off. Reds. Rebell, Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 956-957.
Quantities of small arms were received through the Blockade; from September 30, 1862, to September 30, 1863, 113,504 were received, together with "large quantities of saltpeter, lead, cartridges, percussion caps, flannel and paper for cartridges, leather, hardware." Four steamers were engaged in carrying out cotton and bringing in supplies. At Selma, Alabama, there were the state and Confederate arsenals, and a naval foundry with machinery of English make. It is estimated that one-half of the cannon and two-thirds of the ammunition which were used during the last two years of the war were manufactured at the Selma foundries and factories. Cannon, siege and sea-coast guns were made at the Tredegar Iron Works. A laboratory for smelting lead was situated at Petersburg, Va. It was capable of smelting a thousand pounds of lead per day. The arsenal at Richmond grew to large proportions and produced the ordnance stores which the army of the North required. The arsenals at Augusta and


An editorial in De Bow's Review, 1861, stated "all over the South, there are the most gratifying evidences of progress in the arts and manufactures, stimulated by the presence of war and of non-intercourse. Artillery, small arms, gunpowder and every description of missile are being fabricated; and necessity which is the Mother of Invention, will soon make us self-sustaining in everything," pp. 677-678.

Governor Shorter of Alabama wrote to the Confederate Chief of Staff, describing the situation in Alabama as follows: "Coming over the mountains you visit Tuscaloosa, where are located a large cotton factory, and tannery, and shoe establishment and iron foundry—leaving Tuscaloosa and proceeding south upon the western line of Bibb County, you come upon the Bibb County factory, one of the largest in the state. * * * At Gainesville the Confederate Government has a hospital, workshops and valuable stores, and at Demopolis, supplies * * * at Selma, besides the Alabama Arsenal, removed to this city from Vernon, the Government has established there an extensive naval foundry, where it hopes very soon to cast the heaviest ordnance. Quantities of shot and shell are already being turned out, and before a great while it is expected to roll there heavy iron-plating for our men of war. The state is now establishing there a manufactory of spinning cards, cotton and woolen—also the Alabama Arms Manufacturing Co., which contains machinery for the manufacture of the Enfield rifle * * * Both in this city and in Selma there are railroad depots and machine shops for manufacturing cars and repairing engines * * * along the line of the Alabama and Tennessee River Railroad are located some of the most valuable iron establishments in the Confederacy. They are in the counties of Bibb, Shelby and Calhoun." Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I, Vol. LII, pt. 2, pp. 480-481.
Selma were serviceable to the armies serving the South and the West.\footnote{52}{Selwab, Confederate States, pp. 271. It is stated in this study that there were few plants in operation after 1863. The above table and the subsequent statement by General Gorgas definitely refutes this statement.}

Preparations for the production of gunpowder were begun by the establishment of two private mills in Tennessee. Later a government mill was established at Augusta, and another at San Antonio.\footnote{53}{Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I, Vol. II, pp. 958.} After 1862, the former was in full operation; and in the year ending 1863, over one million pounds of powder were produced. At the beginning of 1865, 5,000 pounds per day were being manufactured.\footnote{54}{Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I, Vol. II, pp. 957.} The principal ingredient in the manufacture of gunpowder was niter. Beds of niter were discovered in Alabama, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. By October, 1864, the Confederate niter beds produced from two to three ounces of niter per cubic foot of earth, and the average

\begin{tabular}{lll}
\textbf{September, 1862} & \textbf{November, 1862} & \textbf{December, 1863} \\
Richmond—Laboratory Armory & Richmond—Arsenal Armory & Richmond—Arsenal Armory \\
Fayetteville—Armory & Clarksville—Harness Laboratories & Fayetteville—Arsenal Armory \\
Augusta—Arsenal & Petersburg—Smelting Works & Asheville—Armory \\
Charleston—Arsenal & Danville—Depot & Charlotte—Foundry Laboratory \\
Mt. Vernon—Arsenal & Fayetteville—Arsenal Armory & Columbus—Arsenal \\
Baton Rouge—Arsenal & Ashe—Armory & Athens—Armsory \\
Virginia Military Institute & Salisbury— & Tallahassee—Armsory \\
& Charleston—Arsenal & Macon—Arsenal Powder Mills \\
& Augusta—Arsenal Foundry & Laboratory \\
& Powder Mills & Foundry \\
& Atlanta—Arsenal Foundry & Montgomery—Arsenal \\
& Montgomery—Arsenal Foundry & Columbus—Arsenal \\
& Macon—Arsenal Laboratory & Selma—Arsenal Foundry \\
& Columbus—Arsenal Foundry & Mills \\
& Selma—Arsenal Mills & (Southern Historical Association Papers, Vol. II, pp. 61. Ibid., Vol. XII, pp. 74.) \\
\end{tabular}
European niter beds after four years of age produced four ounces. By the year ending September 30, 1864, General Gorgas reported that "the mechanical means for the production of powder are ample for a war conducted on any scale, and so arranged as to be almost beyond capacity." 55

In the same report of 1864, General Gorgas remarked that "while the army has been well supplied during the past year, there are causes operating which will render future results less satisfactory. The chief of these is the diminution of skilled workmen. Without statistics I can only assure you that the number and quality of workmen have greatly fallen off since the middle of the year 1863. While two years ago it was difficult to get machinery, we have now a surplus and cannot get workmen to run it. This opens a most melancholy prospect and indicates an evil that cannot too soon be corrected. While we are importing workmen by twos they are leaving us by the hundred. I formerly reported to you that from Christmas, 1863, to May, 1864, fifty-five men left our government workshops in Richmond. This may give a glimpse of the exodus. Nor is it that this class of men is disaffected or unpatriotic that they leave the country—when called on they have fought and fought well—but workmen will not fight and work." 56

In response to an official request on February 9, 1865, General Gorgas again reported that he could overcome all impediments in the production of arms and ammunition if he could secure the workmen. Said he, "if these men and slaves can be permanently...

56 Ibid., pp. 734.

The foregoing statements concerning the manufacture of materials in the Confederacy are supported by the Journal of General Gorgas. This quotation was furnished me by Professor Channing of Harvard University. It is a direct copy from the manuscript. "April 8, 1864. It is three years ago today since I took charge of the Ordnance Department of the Confederate States, at Montgomery—three years of constant work and application, I have succeeded beyond my utmost expectations. From being the worst supplied of the Bureaus of the War Department it is now the best. Large arsenals have been organized at Richmond, Fayetteville, Augusta, Charles, Columbus, Macon, Atlanta and Selma, and smaller ones at Danville, Lynchburg and Montgomery, besides other establishments. A superb powder mill has been built at Augusta, the credit of which is due to Col. G. W. Rause. Lead smelting works were established by me at Petersburg and turned over to the Nitre and Mining Bureau, when that Bureau was at my request separated from mine. A cannon foundry established at Macon for heavy guns, and bronze foundries at Macon, Columbus, Georgia, and at Augusta; a foundry for shot and shell at Salisbury, N. C.; a large shop for leather work at Clarksville, Va.; besides the armories here and at Fayetteville, a manufactory of carbines has been built up here; a rifle factory at Asheville transferred to Columbia, S. C.; a new and very large armory at Macon, including a pistol factory, built up under contract here and sent to Atlanta, and thence transferred under purchase to Macon; a second pistol factory at Columbus, Ga. All these have required incessant toil and attention." The Journal of General Gorgas, pp. 133.
attached to this bureau, I will answer for the supply of ordnance and ordnance stores to the army."

The supply of medicines for the Confederacy were obtained from four sources, from the limited supply on hand, from purchases smuggled through the blockade and Union lines, from captured supplies—often in large quantities and from native medicine plants. A pamphlet was issued by Surgeon-General Jones, of the Medical College of Georgia, in 1861, in which directions were given for the gathering of medicines from plants. Drug laboratories were erected at Lincolnton, North Carolina; Macon, Georgia; Augusta, Georgia; Columbia, South Carolina; and Tyler, Texas. Surgical cloth was made by southern cotton factories. Surgical instruments were scarce, but there was one company which manufactured them in North Carolina.

The manufacture of tools, implements and materials for the building of bridges was begun at Richmond, Charleston, Augusta, Mobile, Demopolis and in the Trans-Mississippi region. The great difficulty was the lack of iron. The production of iron, lead, copper and all minerals was added to the Niter Bureau. President Davis reported that the Bureau was main-


The estimated manufacturing capacity of the Government Powder Mills, according to the report of General Gorgas, December, 1864, was:

- Augusta Mills ................................. 5,000 pounds per day
- Selma Mills .................................... 500 pounds per day
- Raleigh Mills .................................. 600 pounds per day
- Richmond Mills .............................. 1,500 pounds per day

Total........................................... 7,600 pounds per day

Southern Historical Association Papers, II, pp. 61.

The estimated manufacture of rifles and carbines was as follows:

- Richmond Armory ......................... 25,000 rifles —450 men needed
- Fayetteville ................................ 10,000 rifles —250 men needed
- Columbia Armory ........................... 4,000 rifles —125 men needed
- Athens Armory .............................. 10,000 rifles —250 men needed
- Tallahassee Armory ....................... 6,000 carbines —150 men needed

Total—55,000 rifles and carbines and 1,225 men needed.

Ibid., II, pp. 61.

The arms actually manufactured are shown in the following report for January, 1863:

Small arms (rifles, muskets, carbines and pistols)—Fabricated, 14,349; remaining on hand, 9,876.

Public Armories—Rifles, muskets and carbines manufactured per month, 2,050.

Private Armories—1,550.

Sabers manufactured per month—3,500.

taining from twenty to thirty furnaces with an annual yield of 50,000 tons of pig iron. In 1861 it was reported that ten large iron furnaces in Virginia, all but three in Tennessee, all in Georgia and four in Alabama were burned or destroyed by the advancing Federal troops. The report adds that the Bureau has had to reconstruct as well as produce. There were private iron works in North Carolina and Virginia engaged in advertising their wares and seeking workmen. There were two large foundries, Tredegar Works in Richmond and the Leeds Foundry at New Orleans. The capture of these cities by the Federal troops ended their existence as Confederate units. The Haxall Flour Mills at Richmond were said to be the largest on the continent. Several flour mills were established in Yazoo County, Mississippi. Cotton mills were erected throughout the South. A Government shop for the manufacture of clothing for soldiers was conducted in North Carolina. Tanneries, saddle and harness factories, shoe factories and private enterprises of many kinds were conducted.

In February, 1864, there was complaint made to the Quartermaster that many soldiers of General Lee’s Army were without shoes. The reply was that 100,000 pairs of shoes had been lost off Wilmington, but that within two months there would be enough leather to manufacture 600,000 pairs of shoes. North Carolina arranged with manufacturers at different

61 "Derr’s Furnace
Six miles east of Lincolnton, N. C.
My furnace is now in full operation—
Molasses Mills, boilers, etc., cast to order on moderate terms."
(Western Democrat, Charlotte, N. C., February 7, 1865.)
"Rehoboth Furnace in Blast
Three miles northeast of Iron Station, Lincoln Co., N. C.
The Proprietors are prepared to do castings of all kinds."
(Raleigh Daily Confederate, March 30, 1865.)
"Iron! Iron!
The Lockville Mining and Manufacturing Company are now making iron of the best quality for plantation purposes—
Iron now ready for delivery at the works in Chatham County."
(Ibid., January 7, 1865.)
The following appeared in the Richmond Dispatch: “Harvey Hellings & Jew—
ep—take pleasure in informing the public that they have in full operation a first—
class Ladies Shoes Manufactory—where they are prepared to turn out in any quan—
tity the very finest quality of Ladies Shoes—"
points in the state to supply its soldiers. To some, the state furnished the hides and had them tanned on shares. Some hides were imported and others were made by private manufacturers. The report of the Quartermaster in February, 1865, stated that there was a "fair supply" of leather, or hides in the vats, and a "moderate supply" of shoes. He adds that the manufacturing facilities were ample but that the raw material presented a real difficulty.

Large quantities of supplies were collected in Richmond, Raleigh and other places in North Carolina. Quantities were destroyed. We are told that in the retreat before Sherman from Raleigh, there were removed 100,000 suits of clothing, 10,000 pairs of shoes, 150,000 pounds of bacon. At Salisbury, the length of four entire squares was needed to burn the material, equal in value to about one million in specie. The material, which was not distributed to the inhabitants on the evacuation of Richmond, was also burned. Yet, with these evidences of plenty in the army depots, there seems to have been a want in the army. The South was handicapped, but the scarcity seems to have been due to the matter of equitable distribution than absence of the materials themselves. The Richmond Dispatch seemed to realize this when in an editorial it was said, "we have men enough, material enough, resources enough; all we need is the skillful and judicious use of our means." A General Order from General Lee, February 11, 1865, stated that the resources "wisely and vigorously employed are ample, and with a brave army, sustained by a determined and united people, success with God's assistance cannot be doubted."

Transportation. The railroad development of the North was far ahead of the development of the South. The former had roads which were better built, equipped and manned. Moreover, the southern railroads were for the most part local lines, connecting coast and inland cities. The principal termini were Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans, Richmond and Petersburg. There was a slight increase in the mileage in the South through the period of the Civil War. In 1861, there were 9,283 miles of railroad there, and in 1864 there were 9,511. This increase may have been

69 Last Ninety Days in N. C., 146, 204-205.
70 Richmond Dispatch, February 1, 1865.
71 Off. Reds. Rebell, Ser. I, XIXI.
occasioned by the advancing Federal armies, which found it necessary to build such lines. But there was road building by the states, the Confederate Government and by private concerns. The Confederate Government began in 1861, to consider a railroad connection between Danville, Va., and Greensboro, N. C., a distance of 48 miles. President Davis called attention to it in his message. After protest by members of Congress against government aid being granted through the loan of a million dollars, the work was begun; but it was not completed until May, 1864. Another connection was suggested from Selma, Alabama, to Meridian, Mississippi. This route was to shorten the line from Richmond to Vicksburg and New Orleans; and it would give Vicksburg access to Alabama and Georgia. The distance was about 100 miles. It was completed in 1862. Another route was begun during the war but it was not completed until the close of the war. This was between Rome, Georgia, and Blue Mountain, Alabama. The connection between Montgomery, Alabama, and Selma, Alabama, was made before the close of the war, a distance of about 15 miles. Thus there was the building of nearly 200 miles of railroad by the assistance of the Confederate Government between 1861 and 1864. In March, 1863, a blanket appropriation of $21,000,000 was made to complete several small lines.75

On the other hand, there were weaknesses in the southern roads. The roads terminating in several towns did not connect with one another, and freight unloaded at one depot had to be hauled across town and reloaded at the other. This was necessary in Petersburg, Chattanooga, Knoxville, Bristol, Lynchburg, Savannah, Augusta, Charlotte, Raleigh, Wilmington and other places. There was a shortage of cars and engines also. Before the war the supply was scarce; but some roads were building their cars before the war. The Annual Reports of the Railroad Companies of the State of Virginia for the year ending September, 1860, states that the freight cars built by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad Company will challenge comparison with any in the United States, "for the perfection to which they have been brought and the means adopted to render them as desirable as possible." 76 An English merchant who traveled in the South stated that he saw many hundreds of "southern made cars, for both freight and passengers, and very useful things they seemed." 77

During the opening periods of the war, the railroad companies expecting an early termination of the war placed their reliance upon the stocks which they had on hand, and consequently they made little effort to replenish the stock.78 Soon all roads were suffering for want of cars and engines. The few shops which could repair cars and engines had been taken over

75 Ibid., pp. 1114.
76 Annual Report, Railroad Companies of Va., 1860.
77 Two months in the Confederate States, pp. 77-79.
by the Government to be used for war purposes. The Government believed that the railroads should look to their own repairs, and imbued with laissez-faire doctrines, it took no hand in the repair of the roads until necessity demanded. By degrees the necessity of supervision arose; and in 1861, W. S. Ashe, formerly President of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, was appointed Major in superintending the transportation of troops. In 1862, Colonel Wadly was assigned to the supervision and control of troops on all railroads. His powers were more extensive than those of Ashe. But his nomination was not agreed to for some reason by the Senate. In 1863, General Lawton was made Quartermaster-General and Colonel Sims was appointed in charge of railroads. This type of supervising and conferring with the individual roads was as far as the Government went until February, 1865, when an act was passed authorizing the Secretary of War to place any railroad, canal or telegraph line under such officers as he should direct and to give it any necessary aid and repair. This was passed too late in the war to be of any consequence.7

Gradually the tracks and the road equipment wore out, and smaller lines were torn up in order to replenish the larger ones. Speed was sacrificed in order to save the roads. Passenger trains were limited to one or two per day in the latter part of 1864.8 The railroads seemed, however, to be prospering financially. The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company paid a dividend of 15 per cent in December, 1864.9 The North Carolina Railroad Company declared a dividend, which was semi-annual, of 25 per cent, in February, 1865.10 The Richmond and Danville Railroad declared a dividend of 5 per cent, and the Richmond and Petersburg later declared a dividend of 10 per cent.11

In 1864, the situation of the roads became serious. The various presidents had urged Congress to allow the shops and mechanics to be employed in repair work, but to no avail. They were too much imbued with particularism themselves to combine in order to have their work done by themselves. In the same year, General Lawton wrote that the fact could not be disguised that the railroads were in a critical condition and that the needs of transportation must continue to cause greater anxiety as the war progressed.12 The gauge of some of the tracks was not the same, and the various roads refused to adopt any rule which would allow the use of a united system. This was one of the difficulties between the roads of Virginia and North Carolina. The Virginia roads were five feet. The Piedmont roads were less than five feet.

7 The result of this act has been noted above.
8 Richmond Dispatch, November 28, 1863. August 1, 1864.
9 Richmond Examiner, December 28, 1864.
10 Western Democrat, February 7, 1865.
In February, 1865, Colonel Sims wrote that new cars were being built under difficulty, but that new engines could not be manufactured in the Confederacy. He concluded that “not a single bar of railroad iron has been rolled in the Confederacy since the war.” And yet, there was plenty of iron in northern Alabama, Tennessee, North Carolina and South Carolina, which could have been extracted. Many locomotives needed tires, but somehow tires could not be secured owing, as Colonel Sims said, to the fact that the work of the shops was absorbed by the Government for war purposes. He said that every important article of consumption by the railroads could be produced in the Confederates states, and what the roads asked was iron ore, permission for foundries, rolling-mills and a liberal system of detailing machinists from the army. Many machinists had left the South. Colonel Sims reported that the hardships of war and the fear of conscription had induced many to leave, and in so doing “they felt but little or no interest in our country or cause.”

Without doubt the military and material resources of the South were made less available by insufficient internal transportation also. The waterways, both east and west, were occupied early in the war by the Union forces. On the other hand, the steamboat owners would not allow the use of their boats, and in order to secure transportation, the boats had to be impressed. The Quartermaster’s Department sought to buy up the available horse and wagon supply for the use of the army; and the Subsistence Department found much difficulty in getting its food material transported. The farmers around Richmond in 1865 stopped bringing their food to market because the officers of the city impressed not only the food but the horse and wagon. In order to quell the reaction which set in, an order was issued stating that there were to be no seizures of such material. Transportation was the great problem of the Confederacy, and it was one of the influential causes in bringing about the collapse.

Numbers. The attempt has been made by many writers to show that the South, from the beginning to the end of the war, did not have more than 600,000 men under arms. While, on the contrary, they contend that the North had 2,800,000 men under arms. Colonel Livermore has shown that these figures are incorrect, and taking into consideration the differences in the length of the enlistments, which differed in the two sections, the disparity is not so great. But although there were only 600,000 men

85 Ibid., Ser. IV, III, pp. 1092.
87 Captain Kay of the River Rangers to General Polk, January 14, 1864. “A great number of the western steamboat men will do anything for the South that does not require the sacrifice of their boats—these people are like many through the lines, they are for themselves first, and for their country next.” Off. Reds. Rebell., Vol. I,II, pt. 2, pp. 599.
in the Confederate army, if this group had been really an army determined to secure its independence and embittered against its foe on account of manifest wrongs, it would have counted for more than it did. Is it not strange also that out of a population of five and a half million peoples of European descent and three millions of African descent, only 600,000 fighting men could be secured? In the course of the conflict every white male between seventeen and fifty years, capable of bearing arms was called to the colors. Certainly in this group there must have been one million men of military years. The Census of 1860 bears out this conjecture. There were over a million men of arms-bearing age in the Confederacy, while about one-half of this number turned out to fight. In spite of the efforts of the Confederate Government, in spite of appeals to patriotism, only a proportionately small number could be found with Generals Lee and Johnston. Clearly, if the South could muster only 600,000 soldiers from its population, and the machinists could not be kept in the factories, it would seem that the heart of the South was not in the movement for independence.

The historians who have written of the South have placed its failure upon the advantage obtained by the larger numbers in the northern armies. At the same time, they overlook the reproach cast upon the South by the presence of so few of its soldiers at the front. In an area of over 700,000 square miles, with a determined population of five and a half millions, the South could have proved herself invincible. Those who were in the army fought nobly, but they were only a part of the whole South. The resources which were employed, were employed to the limit, but they were only a part of the great store in the South. In January, 1865, it was estimated that there were 415,000 Confederate men in arms. Three months later, the number who surrendered amounted to about 175,000. If the heart of the South had been in the struggle, the experience of past struggles for independence would have been repeated, or—to say the least—the South might have defended itself more effectively.

With regard to the resources of the South, the following conclusions may be drawn: (1) There was food in the South in sufficient quantity to sustain the army and the people, but there was a relative scarcity of food in the urban and military centers due to faulty distribution and the difficulty of attracting food to the markets; (2) the armies of the Confederacy were not compelled to surrender because of a lack of food in the South or the paucity of its resources; and (3) the resources of the South were inadequately employed because of a lack of trained industrial leadership. The collapse of the South could not have been due, directly and completely, to inadequate resources.

**T. L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses, pp. 46, 137.**
II. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN THE CONFEDERACY.

The Cabinet. In 1860, Jefferson Davis was probably the ablest Congressional leader from the South. Personally, he was a man of great ability and strong will, but also a man of little tact in his personal relationships. He had won his way by his efforts to a place of leadership in southern affairs. The mantle of Calhoun had fallen upon him. His career as Representative, Senator and Cabinet member had kept him in public prominence. He was a West Point Graduate, he had served in the Mexican War and his service as Secretary of War under President Pierce had increased his knowledge of military organization. President Polk offered him an appointment as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, but he refused the appointment on the ground that the President had no authority to make such appointments. He had, therefore, both military training and experience as a public officer. In his election as President of the Confederacy, there seems to have been little political intrigue. Some of the delegates favored Cobb, others favored Hunter and Rhett; but Davis received the majority and finally the unanimous support of all. When his name was presented at the Convention, the majority of the delegates realized that he was the best qualified man then available for the Presidency. Moreover, he was reckoned as a conservative Secessionist, and in addition to his ability as a recognized leader he was a candidate upon whom the various elements could unite. The criticisms of President Davis began to arise early in the war. When the capital of the Confederacy was moved from Montgomery to Richmond, he was blamed for its removal in spite of the fact that he had vetoed the first bill for the removal. After the battle of Manassas, the failure of the Confederate forces to follow up their victory was blamed upon Davis. From this time forward, criticism grew in intensity, but in this early period there was no organized opposition. The papers most opposed to President Davis were the Richmond Examiner, under John M. Daniel and his associate, Edward A. Pollard, and the Charleston Mercury, under Barnwell Rhett. The first Cabinet was composed of Toombs of Georgia, as Secretary of State; Walker of Alabama, as Secretary of War; Meminger of South Carolina, as Secretary of the Treasury; Mallory of Florida, as Secretary of the Navy; Reagan of Texas, as Postmaster-General, and Benjamin as Attorney-General. The Cabinet and the Government started out with apparent unanimity, but this was not destined to last very long. Some

89 "Everybody wants Mr. Davis to the General-in-chief or President. Keitt and Boyce and a party preferred Howd'l Cobb for President, and the fire-eaters per se want Barnwell Rhett." Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, pp. 6. William & Mary Quarterly, XXII. pp. 214. Dodd, Jefferson Davis, pp. 220-230.
of these men, especially Walker and Meminger, seemed to have no peculiar fitness for their positions, but it was doubtful whether their departments would have been handled by others in any different or more successful way. No leader of the South expected a long war, therefore Walker, the Secretary of War, might go about boasting that “the blood which would be shed in the war might be wiped up with a pocket handkerchief.” As early as July, 1861, Mrs. Chesnut wrote, “and now I could be happy but this Cabinet of ours are in such bitter quarrels among themselves—everybody abusing everybody.”

The Master Spirit was manifesting itself. The training of the slaveholder showed itself in its hideous form in the matter of government. Everybody in the Cabinet wanted to lead. Above them was a more powerful will, that of the President. Differences soon developed and changes in the Cabinet appointments were frequent. Five Secretaries of War, three Secretaries of State, and four Attorney-Generals were appointed during the war. 2 Alexander Stephens, the Vice-President, did not work harmoniously with President Davis. He had been slow to assent to leave the Union, his support of the government continued to be weak, and his personal antipathy to President Davis was always evident. Said he, “I was not born to acknowledge a master from either the North or the South.”

Toombs disagreed with what seemed to him a weak war policy on the part of the government. He resigned from the Cabinet and accepted a commission in the army. Soon thereafter he gave up his commission and retired, saying that he felt “little like fighting for a people base enough to submit to such despotism from such contemptible sources.”

Mrs. Chesnut again writes, “there is a perfect magazine of discord and discontent in that Cabinet; only wants a hand to apply the torch and up they go.” But discord and criticism soon spread and scores of men, prominent in their sections, broke into open hostility with the administration.

President Davis was unable to quiet the discontent. President Lincoln was also criticized, but he was tactful enough to quell the storms which arose about him. The attacks upon the Confederate Cabinet grew more violent in 1864; and Meminger was forced to resign under fire. The principal attacks of the next year were directed against Benjamin, Seddon and Northrop. A demand for the resignation of Benjamin in the Senate failed only by a tie vote, the ballots standing eleven to eleven. Seddon

93 Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, pp. 90.
94 Southern Historical Association Papers, III, pp. 6-7.
95 Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, pp. 785-786.
97 Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, pp. 108.
resigned under criticism February 9, 1865; and in the closing days of the war, Northrop resigned. It is said that his greatest sin seemed to have been the fact that he was a classmate of Jefferson Davis at West Point.97 The acuteness of the Cabinet situation may be discerned in a letter of Thomas Bocock of Virginia, at one time Speaker of the House. After suggesting to President Davis the reconstruction of the Cabinet, he stated that a vote that the country lacked confidence in the Cabinet would have the support of three-fourths of the members of Congress.98 Here then the spectacle is presented of a disunited Cabinet, quarreling among themselves, criticized by Congress, distrusted by the country. How could the fighting temper of a people be sustained when they had little confidence in those who headed the Civil Administration? In accounting for the collapse the psychological effect of this condition cannot be overlooked.

The Congress. President Davis found the first Congress inclined to yield their “preconceived opinions” to his suggestions.99 In this first Congress of the permanent government, February, 1862, the relations of the President and Congress became strained over the conduct of the war, the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus, Impressment and conscription. The last three measures were recommended by the President, and the passage of them against well-founded opposition led to the cry that Congress was subservient to the wishes of the President. But when the first session closed, the power of the President was secure, although there was much opposition in the Congress.

In the second session, 1862-1863, there were complaints of the lack of food, criticisms of the Commissary Department, and the relations of the Executive with the Congress was often strained. In the third session of 1863, the same undisputed control by the President was manifest. During the summer of 1863, the President and the Cabinet were severely criticized, and there were predictions of opposition, but when the Congress assembled in December, the President’s recommendations were carried for maintaining the army, increasing the revenue and a wider extension of the law.100 Special committees were appointed to investigate the charges against the Commissary Department, exemptions from military service and Presidential appointments; and we are told that the President and Congress parted “at the adjournment in bad temper.”101

During the last session, November, 1864, to March, 1865, the President’s veto was more freely used than in any other session, but it was often

97 Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, pp. 97.
99 Davis, Rise and Fall, I, pp. 304; II, pp. 241. Jones, the War Clerk, found that there were not a dozen members in the whole Congress with any pretensions to statesmanship.” II, pp. 157.
100 Southern Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIX, pp. 22.
overridden in both the Senate and the House. The last days of the session were filled with criticism of the President—veiled criticisms couched in resolutions of information. It is conclusive, however, that President Davis was the active leader of Congress in every session. His veto was exercised 38 times during his term of office, while during the same period President Lincoln exercised the veto 3 times. Just how much effect upon the breakdown of southern resistance, the difficulties of the Cabinet, Congress and the President had, it is difficult to say. Just how far the morale of the army was affected by these controversies no one may say. However, the mastery maintained by President Davis over both Cabinet and Congress led the South to believe that another despotism was being substituted for the despotism which had been rejected in 1861. There was no collapse of the organized government until the collapse of the military, but in spite of the secret sessions of Congress, it is very evident that the quarrels of politicians as to the purposes of the war, and the methods of waging it must have had its effect in dividing the opinions of the people and in lessening the unanimity and collective support which had existed in the early years of the war. The fortunes of the Confederacy had to contend not only with the North but with the internal dissensions of its political leaders. Such a situation must have been contributory to the moral collapse. George Eggleston says, that so marked was "the popular discontent not with Mr. Davis only but with the entire government and Congress that a Richmond newspaper dared to suggest a counter revolution as the only means left of saving the cause from the strangling it was receiving at the hands of its guardians at Richmond." 103

Popular Opposition to Administration Measures. One of the most frequent criticisms of Mr. Davis was his favoritism in appointments. It was said that Northrop, the Commissary-General, was inefficient, but that he was kept in office by the favor of the President. From the beginning to the end of the war there were complaints against him. After the first Bull Run Campaign, General Beauregard criticized the Department; and in January, 1863, General Lee wrote General Northrop expressing dissatisfaction with the Commissary and stating that no beef had been issued to the cavalry for 18 months. The retention of General Pemberton and General Bragg led to further opposition. General Bragg was called "a man of iron head and wooden hand" by the Richmond Examiner, which was circulated among his troops; and a weekly on learning that he was ordered to Wilmington gave utterance to the expression, "we understand that General Bragg has been ordered to Wilmington. Good-bye, Wilmington!" Such expressions must have had their effect upon the morale of the soldiers and the people. The success of the Confederacy demanded

103 Eggleston, pp. 227.
104 Chestnut, pp. 97.
that the highest confidence and understanding should exist between the President and the commanding generals, as well as between the commanding general and the army. Between President Davis and General Joseph E. Johnston, there was a feeling of mutual distrust. General Polk wrote to Colonel Harvie of Mississippi, January, 1861, suggesting that something should be done to bring the two together. Later in the year, General Johnston was removed, and General Hood was given the command. The popular clamor became so great for the reinstatement of General Johnston, after the defeats of Hood in Tennessee, that Mr. Davis was forced to yield.\footnote{105}

The military reverses of 1862 led to the enactment in February of a law suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus. It was limited to thirty days. In March the suspension of the writ was declared in Richmond. It was extended during the next few weeks to other disaffected counties in Virginia, Tennessee and South Carolina. At first there was no opposition to the measure except from Vice-President Stephens and isolated individuals, who insisted that the military should be subservient to the civil authority. In 1863, the law was again enacted. But the opposition, especially in North Carolina, caused it to be dropped, when it expired by limitation in August, 1864.\footnote{106} The Legislature of North Carolina passed a resolution protesting against the suspension of the writ. The Legislature of Mississippi instructed the Mississippi Senators and Representatives to support a repeal of the measure. The Georgia Legislature declared the writ unconstitutional.\footnote{107} It is interesting to note, on the contrary, that martial law was declared in the North, and it was an effective means of restraining the opposition. It seems to have been successful because it was supported as a war measure by the people as well as Congress. In the South, the States-Right notions, over-developed ideas of liberty and personal freedom hindered a similar development.\footnote{108}

Another cause of opposition was the conscription of men to fill the ranks of the army. At first there was voluntary enlistments to fill the army.
Then in March, 1861, the President was authorized to call as many troops as he deemed necessary. In December of the same year, an act was passed offering a bounty of $50 to volunteers of three years' service, and granting to those who re-enlisted a furlough of sixty days with free transportation. This method was found insufficient, and in April, 1862, the President was authorized to call out all male whites between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years for three years' service. In September, the ages were extended to forty-five years, but those between seventeen and eighteen, and forty-five and fifty years were not required to serve outside the state.

The exercise of this power to conscribe aroused the feeling of the South. It was difficult to reconcile the thought of a strong central power, composed of sovereign and independent states equally strong, waging war. The people of the South resented the centralization to which the central government was forced to go in order to fill the ranks of the Confederate army. The Confederacy was formed as a protest against centralization, and yet its people suffered oppressive measures of greater severity.

At various times, the President and the Governors of most of the states came into conflict upon questions connected with conscription, such as the interference of the state courts in releasing conscripts on writs of Habeas Corpus, disagreements as to the necessity of suspending conscription in certain districts and the enrollment of the officials of the state. Governor Vance of North Carolina protested against the enrollment of state officers; and the North Carolina Supreme Court declared in Johnson v. Mallet in 1863, that all officers and agents of the state, provided for by the constitution, were exempted from conscription. In 1861, the total number exempted on the certificates of governors was approximately 18,800, of which 13,818 were in North Carolina and Georgia.

In 1864, the total number exempted was 1010. Bulletin of the University of Georgia, March, 1917, pp. 431.

Publications, North Carolina Historical Commission, Bulletin No. 15.


Bulletin of the University of Georgia, March, 1917, pp. 426.

estimated by the Superintendent of Conscription as 67,054, for the states east of the Mississippi.\footnote{114}{Ibid., pp. 426. Public and Private Laws, Confederate States of America, 1862-1864, pp. 77-79.}

In March, 1863, another law was passed providing for boards of assessment to determine the value of impressed goods. The prices were to be published and the owners were to follow them in procuring sales. Toward the end of the war these prices were invariably far below the market value of the products. Farmers refused to sell their products for such prices. They bid them, reserving them for better prices. The result was that the system of impressment broke down completely. For the farmers would not sell to the government for half the price which they could obtain in the local markets. Few things are more difficult than to make a man sell his goods against his own wishes and at a loss to himself. The produce loan and the tax in kind bore heavily upon the morale of the food-producing population; and they actually lessened the available supply of food by discouraging the bringing of it to the markets. When agricultural products did reach the city, they were often seized by the government at a price far below the market price. This action stimulated the bitterest feeling against the military and the government.\footnote{115}{General Northrop reported, "Our officers have been unable to get anything,—that impressments are impracticable,—that the people will not supply grain under notice of impressments which cannot be enforced, and will not prepare their crop for sale, unless market prices are given. The people in both Carolinas and Georgia have vehemently opposed impressments." Off. Reds. Rebell, Ser. IV, Vol. III, pp. 932. Cf. Ibid., pp. 1008-1011.}

So that Governor Vance, writing to President Davis, could say, "I will not deny that there is a bad state of feeling here toward the Confederate Government."\footnote{116}{Publications, North Carolina Historical Commission, Bulletin 15, pp. 54.}

States-Rights. The exercise of such arbitrary powers led to conflicts between the state and central governments. The people of the states were jealous of their rights as citizens of the states and they were suspicious of the encroachments of the Confederate Government. The arbitrary and over-bearing policy of the central government produced a depressing effect upon the spirits of the people and the army. In South Carolina it was proposed to organize a state army and to instruct the legislature to take effectual measures to prevent the agents of the Confederate Government from raising troops in South Carolina except by voluntary enlistment or by applying to the executive of the state to call out the militia. In North Carolina it was mortifying to Governor Vance, to find entire brigades of North Carolina troops commanded by strangers and "in many cases our brave colonels are made to give place to colonels from distant states."\footnote{117}{Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 189.}

In contravention of the Confederate law an act was passed by the state
legislature exempting millers, blacksmiths, salt-workers, etc. In Georgia, Governor Brown and the Legislature insisted upon the right of the troops to elect their own officers, for this privilege was provided by the constitution of the state of Georgia. Secretary Seddon refused to recognize this right. Governor Brown replied that he was forced to acquiesce in what he considered "a great wrong to thousands of gallant Georgia troops and a palpable infringement of the rights and sovereignty of the state." When Atlanta was threatened by Sherman, Governor Brown wrote to President Davis that the forty to fifty Georgia regiments then engaged in defending Richmond should be sent to Georgia. For Atlanta was in danger, and Georgia would be overrun, "while her troops were taking part in distant raids." When Sherman continued to advance, he blamed the administration and refused to place the remainder of the militia under the President's control, thus "surrendering the last vestige of the sovereignty of the state."

The Governor of North Carolina threatened to recall the North Carolina troops from service in other states, for they should serve primarily for the defense of the state, "not to assume the responsibility of the Confederate Government." In Virginia, feeling was roused by the President's formation of the provisional state troops into a Confederate army. Governor Milton of Florida protested against the action of the Impressment agents who forced the people to accept the prices which they offered. Said he, "such action is incompatible with the rights of the citizens and insulting to free men—better that Florida should be a waste of flowers, enriched with the blood of her brave citizens than to be inhabited by them as slaves or willing to be slaves."

Many southerners thought that there was little to choose between the despotism of President Davis and that of President Lincoln, and that the southern despotism was quite as bad as the northern despotism. From this despotism, the threat was often made to secede. Early in the year 1863, the legislature of North Carolina had contemplated taking the state out of the Confederacy. The Raleigh Progress, of which W. W. Holden was editor, said "If North Carolina had a right to break off from the Federal Government by an act of her convention, she has the relative right to break off from Mr. Davis' government." Public meetings became so frequent that Governor Vance issued a proclamation calling upon the

118 Jones, War Clerk, II, pp. 439.
people not to seek “to cure the evils of one revolution by plunging the country into another.” 123

Toward the close of the war, efforts were made by former Governor Graham, then Senator from North Carolina, to bring about a concerted action with Virginia to restore the states to the Union. 124 He wrote Governor Vance, April 8, 1865, that he had had confidential conversations with a committee of the Virginia Legislature, and that it was important to act in conjunction with that body. 125 March 5, 1865, John A. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, described the condition in other states as follows: “Georgia is in a state that may be properly called insurrectionary against the Confederate authorities. Her public men of greatest influence have cast reproach upon the laws of the Confederacy and the Confederate authorities, and have made the execution of the laws nearly impossible. A mere mention of the condition in Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky, Western Virginia and the line of the Mississippi, the seaboard from the Potomac to the Sabine and North Alabama, is necessary. North Carolina is divided and her divisions prevent her from taking upon herself the support of the war as Virginia has done—there is anarchy in the opinions of men here and few are willing to give counsel and still fewer are willing to incur the responsibility of taking or advising action.” 126

In 1865, resolutions were introduced into the Legislature of Georgia, calling for separate state action to secure peace. President Davis addressed a reply that such action “would tend to create discord instead of united counsels, and to suggest to our enemies the possibility of a dissolution of the Confederacy.” 127 That action in this regard was contemplated is shown by a resolution introduced in January, 1865, in the Confederate Congress declaring that it was revolutionary for any state to negotiate for

123 In Alabama during January, 1865, the state of feeling was reported as such that even where local value in Confederate currency was offered for goods, they could not be secured. General Northrop received a report from Major J. J. Walker saying that they appealed in vain to planters for the immediate delivery of goods and that the promise that there would be immediate payment had no effect on the people. “They no longer credit any promise made by government officials. The case may be stated briefly. The Government has lost the confidence of the people.”

124 Connor, John A. Campbell, pp. 173.

125 Last Ninety Days of the War in North Carolina, pp. 137-141.

126 Reminiscences and Documents relating to the Civil War during the year 1865, by John A. Campbell, pp. 30-31.

Governor Milton wrote from Florida, November 23, 1863, “It is painful to me to believe and to express the opinion, that there exists a necessity for the interposition of state authority to protect the rights, lives and liberty of the citizens against the military orders of Confederate officers for whom personally I entertain the kindest feeling and utmost respect.” Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, II, pp. 973-976.

127 Richmond Dispatch, January 19, 1865.
peace. To which, Jones, the War Clerk, adds the comment, "ill-timed, because self-evident."  

The states were jealous of their rights throughout the war, and one of the greatest of its internal difficulties came through the clashes between the central and state authorities. The right to withdraw from the compact meant the right to destroy the Confederacy, and the right to nullify its laws meant the right to prevent its existence.

**Speculation.** Rising prices made possible a large amount of speculation. With prices rising from month to month, it was impossible for anyone to lose in business it seemed, and many grew rich by investing their notes in commodities and selling them at an advance in price. As the war continued the speculation grew worse. Legislation was passed to prevent it. In 1862, Governor Vance of North Carolina in a message to the Legislature said that the demon of speculation and extortion seemed to have seized upon nearly all sorts and conditions of men, and that all the necessary of life were fast getting beyond the reach of the poor. President Davis in an address to the people of the Confederate States spoke of the attempt of "groveling speculators to forestall the market and to make money out of the life-blood of the defenders." Robert McHenry, of Union County, Arkansas, wrote President Davis, that cotton speculation on the Mississippi River had been carried on, on a very extensive scale, that it was demoralizing the Confederate army in the Trans-Mississippi, who were deserting and going home. Another writer, after quoting the market prices, in January, 1865, asks the question, "Does the government mean to allow the rich speculators, the quartermasters, etc., to starve honest men into the Union?"

The newspapers took hostile attitudes to the importers of goods, for speculation increased the frequency of blockade-running. Finally in 1864, a law was passed forbidding the importation of articles which were not necessary to the army. However, this law was practically inoperative, because smuggling went on and the incentive to import articles was increased by the profits to be made. Some of the states entered the business of blockade-running. North Carolina clothed and furnished its troops with many necessities by blockade steamers. On March 9, 1865, the blockade business of North Carolina showed a profit of $1,325,000. This was largely made by the difference between the price paid by the state for cotton and the value of the articles brought back by the steamers on their return voyage to the state. A statement termed "official" was published

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130 Ibid., pp. 477.
132 Jones, War Clerk, II, pp. 381.
133 North Carolina Historical Commission, 18th Session, pp. 107.
in the Richmond Dispatch, as a quotation from the Manchester Guardian, to the effect that the total ventures made by English capitalists and speculators, counting the value of ships and cargoes, amounted to more than sixty-six million dollars, from the port of Wilmington alone.\textsuperscript{134} The English merchant, who traveled in the South during 1862, remarked that the people of Mobile drove a thriving trade with Havana.\textsuperscript{135} Trade and speculation in these commodities continued until the capture of Wilmington and the evacuation of the southern trade ports in 1865.

Morale was affected in a direct way by this speculation in business. The prices of necessities were passing beyond the reach of many persons, especially the poor, and the body of discontented grew as a result. The demand for blockaded goods and luxuries of all kinds, was, among the moneyed class, far greater than the supply; and of course the goods which commanded the highest prices were the goods which were smuggled through the blockade. Among the upper classes, extravagance was marked. Those who had gained by the war—such a one as Jones, the War Clerk, describes, who kept a provision shop and he was described as having spent $30,000 on the wedding of his daughter. He was known to have been poor before the war. This class of rich persons was given to luxurious living and display. Theaters and balls were the favorite means of spending their wealth. In every large city this group was present. But the capital of the Confederacy seemed to have suffered most.

The state of the currency is another indication of the loss of morale and the decline of confidence in the government. The Confederacy was supported as far as financial interests were concerned by the issue of paper money and bonds. It has been estimated that the actual receipt in specie of the central government was only $27,000,000 during the entire four years, while the Treasury notes were over one billion.\textsuperscript{136} Paper money always has as its foundation the faith of the people in the government back of it. But the people of the Confederacy had not only faith, but enormous quantities of cotton and tobacco were supposed to be the additional security which would be used when the war was over. As the war continued, the faith of the people grew weaker and the currency became cheaper. The Confederate Government, as it needed money, manufactured more of it. The currency became so debased that barter was resorted to; even the physicians of Dinwiddie County, Virginia, decided to accept corn as currency in return for services rendered.\textsuperscript{137} In 1865, in relation to the price of gold, according to the books of what the Richmond Republic, July 6, 1865, called "one of the most reliable and promi-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134} Richmond Dispatch, March 29, 1865.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Two months in the Confederacy, pp. 114-115.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Schwab, The Confederate States, pp. 43.
\item \textsuperscript{137} The Daily Express, Petersburg, Va., February 22, 1865.
\end{itemize}
nent City Brokers,” the price of gold in Confederate Notes was for January, 60 to one.

In 1861, a provision was adopted for the compulsory funding of the notes in circulation, into four per cent bonds. If the bonds were taken by the people all notes of the denomination under one hundred dollars might be exchanged for new ones in the ratio of three dollars of old money for two of the new. As it has been said, this was really a confession of bankruptcy. If neither exchange was made, the old notes were to be taxed out of existence. While the people of the South lost faith in the money of their own government, they readily accepted the United States greenbacks. So general did the circulation become that a law was passed by the Confederate Congress prohibiting the trading with the currency of the Northern government. The states issued notes which were to circulate as money; and especially in North Carolina, the people accepted the state notes more willingly. Paper money circulation depended to a large extent upon the faith of the people in the power of the government to pay its promises to pay. Aside from the operation of economic laws, the unwillingness to take this currency is a manifestation of a lack of confidence in the Confederate Government, and this must be considered in noting the causes of the collapse of this government.

Social Evils. Speculation shaded off into gambling, which became general in the large cities of the South. The increase of gambling houses in Richmond became so great that the authorities were forced to take a hand. The Richmond Dispatch tells of laws being passed to suppress them and of raids upon the establishments and the destruction of the gambling paraphernalia, “faro-tables, chips,” etc.\textsuperscript{138} Another contemporary states that gambling had to be suppressed in the interest of “a half-starved people.”\textsuperscript{139}

Drunkardness and rioting accompanied this evil. The newspapers give frequent accounts of conditions. Commenting upon the Court cases, March 29, 1865, the Richmond Examiner jocosely remarked that “Bacchus was on the rampage yesterday.” Later it was stated that hardly a day passed without the ears being saluted by obscene language either from drunken men or boys, “both white and black, men and women.” A correspondent tells of a scene in a street car, in which a woman and a man were intoxicated and swearing in a most offensive way. He concluded, “What are we to expect if these things continue? What has our Chief of Police been appointed for?”\textsuperscript{140} Riots occurred in several places. In Salisbury, North Carolina, the women rioted against food extortioners.

\textsuperscript{138} Richmond Dispatch, March 21, 1865.

\textsuperscript{139} Eggleston, Rebel’s Recollections, pp. 102.

\textsuperscript{140} Richmond Examiner, January 30, 1865. Jones, the War Clerk, writes that. “There is much jollity and some drunkardness in the streets.” II, pp. 364.
In Atlanta, Mobile, Richmond and other places provision shops were pillaged.\textsuperscript{141}

Prostitution and miscegenation fill the court records, as shown by newspaper accounts. This picture of political and social conditions is not attractive, but it shows the extent of the collapse very plainly. Society had broken down in the Confederacy. Not alone was the desire to fight gone, but the whole civilization was rapidly passing to its destruction. The surrender of the armies not only revealed to the South its defeated condition, but it seems almost to have saved the South from the complete social disorder which would have followed a continuance of the war.

The quarrels of the Cabinet, the Congress, the growing opposition to the administration and the States-Rights Controversy were heading the Confederate craft towards the rocks. Initiated by a small group of leading southerners, the Confederacy had been formed, out of southern discontent. But the spirit of individualism was so strong among them that they could not possibly tolerate a difference of opinion. The slave regime had assisted the growth of this feeling. We are accustomed to consider the effect of the slave system upon the North and the slave. But we often overlook the effect upon the white South. The master of a slave plantation was a feudal lord—a monarch of all he surveyed. It was impossible for the average man to remain in this atmosphere without being affected by it. Many southerners escaped the fullest effects of it, but others, especially the leaders in the rebellion, were affected. There was a great need for a spirit of self-abnegation in the South. As long as the masterful spirit would recognize no submission to a common ideal and to a cooperative endeavor, there could be no successful result. Toombs, Cobb, Rhett and Stephens were unwilling co-operators with many administrative measures. This individualism had its effect upon the passing of the Confederacy.

\textbf{III. The Morale of the Confederacy.}

The first years of the war were enthusiastic years for the Confederacy. A rapid victory was expected, and when this did not come, disappointment appeared. This change in popular sentiment is noticed first in 1863. The discontented class grew rapidly in numbers and power, so that by February, 1863, the Richmond Dispatch is forced to ask, "Can it be that after all, we are not in earnest?" Governor Vance, as early as 1862, plead for "the stern and determined devotion to our cause which alone can sustain a revolution. Let us remember," said he, "that it is the spirit of the people which tyrants cannot subdue. On this depends all. So long as they continue harmonious, willing, self-sacrificing, the united armies of

\textsuperscript{141} Rhodes, History of the United States, V, pp. 362-366.
the continent may be hurled against us in vain.” 142 Again and again, he urged that the spirit of the people should be sustained by every act of the General Assembly. President Davis traveled into many camps, and his speeches were given wide publicity. The newspapers joined in the campaign to encourage the public mind. But despondency and discontent continued to reign. President Davis was discontented with Congress; Congress was equally discontented with President Davis, and the majority of the people continued to be dissatisfied with both.

The Battle of Gettysburg and the loss of Vicksburg seem to be turning points in the southern morale during the war. There is no evidence that the people believed that they were beaten from these events to the end of the war, but there is a gradual sentiment showing a change which begins to manifest itself. Jones, of the Surrey Light Artillery, writes that “our losses have been great but there is yet hope for us”—a half-hearted consolation. Jonathan Worth wrote, August, 1863, that the war could not last much longer. “The want of subsistence,” wrote he, “and the returning sanity of our women will contribute much to close it. The last-dollar and the last-man men abuse Holden’s peace article, but the fact that he has the largest and most rapidly increasing circulation of any other journal in the state indicates the current of public opinion.” (Holden’s subscription list had increased 25 per cent.) He expected also that the expiration of the term of service of the men of 1861, whose term of conscription of three years would expire in 1864, would not re-enlist and that no member of Congress would dare require a longer service. Worth concluded that “the masses are for peace on any terms, they are determined the war shall cease. As soon as this spirit extends from the people to the army, the end will come.” 143

J. E. Joyner, a citizen of Henry Court House, Virginia, had been traveling about the upper counties of Virginia in 1863, and he found an unfortunate state of affairs. He stated that, in parts of Bedford, portions of Botetourt, Roanoke, Montgomery, Giles, Floyd, Franklin, Patrick, Henry and portions of Pittsylvania, etc., the people seemed completely demoralized; and this state of things exists to a great extent among the best citizens. “They think and say that we are whipped, and are bound to be overrun and subjugated. The impression has very extensively obtained that our army is dispirited and is deserting by hundreds and whole regiments have left at a time.” He adds, that the upper counties of North Carolina are much worse than those that he had mentioned; “the deserters are accumulating a vast number of muskets in all the country, and avow that they shall be used against the Confederacy, if there is any attempt to arrest them. There are hundreds of men through this country, aye, I

143 Correspondence of Jonathan Worth, pp. 251, 256.
may say thousands, who ought to be in the service, but there is not moral force enough in the country to bring them out." 144

Desertions. The desertions are indicative also of the extent of opposition to conscription, and of the lack of the will to fight. Desertions on a large scale began in 1863. General Pillow, of the Volunteer Bureau, wrote to General Cooper, the Adjutant-General, July, 1863, reporting that there were 25,000 to 30,000 men liable to duty in Georgia.145 Many deserters collected in the western counties of North Carolina, where sentiment protected them. Governor Vance said that there were 50,000 to 100,000 men who in some form or other were evading duty and that there were 40,000 or 50,000 absentees without leave in North Carolina.146 There were 8,000 to 10,000 deserters and conscripts in the mountains of Alabama. An officer reported that some of them had deserted the second and the fourth time; and he asked for authority to round them up and send them to Virginia, for they would desert if they were sent to the army near their homes.147 H. W. Walter, a prominent citizen of Holly Springs, Mississippi, wrote to Senator Watson, of the same state, that "the country is infested by deserters, robbing friend and foe indiscriminately." 148 In North Carolina, the deserters of the western counties joined with others from Tennessee to terrorize the communities, and many acts of violence were committed. We are told of many persons who hid in dens, caves and other out of the way places in order to avoid conscription.149 Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, reported that the condition in the mountainous districts of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama menaced the existence of the Confederacy "as fatally as either of the armies of the United States." 150 In Virginia, a secret society, known as the Heroes of America, was organized to encourage desertion and to spread disaffection among the people and army. Its membership was said to be large. In Montgomery County there were 800 members, and "adjoining counties were said to be full of these people." 151

Brigadier-General Preston, of the Bureau of Conscription, estimated the number of deserters in March, 1865, as 100,000.152 The Charleston Mercury, quoting the same figures, said that there is a corp of troops of 27,000 on the rolls, which did not turn out 7,000 effective men.153 General Johnston, in his Memoirs, mentions the great difficulty of securing effective

145 Ibid., pp. 681.
146 Ibid., pp. 674.
147 Ibid., pp. 680.
149 Last Ninety Days, pp. 243.
152 Jones, Surrey Light Artillery, pp. 439.
men for fighting purposes. Vice-President Stephens, in an address before the Legislature of Georgia in 1864, declared the whole system of conscription wrong and wholly unconstitutional. In North Carolina, the opposition was more bitter. Public meetings were held and protests were drawn against the arbitrary conscription policy of the government. In many localities in North Carolina the deserters formed the majority and “the stigma attached to desertion was rapidly lost.”

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Rich Man's War. The exemption of slave-owners and overseers led to much discontent. The cry was raised that the war was a “Rich Man's War” and a “Poor Man's Fight.” General Ruggles, of Mississippi, wrote in 1863 that “the people assume that if the more wealthy portion of our population, the slave-holders, will not enter the ranks to defend their property, it was not incumbent on those who had no such large interest at stake. The argument received greater force by the number of substitutes employed by the more wealthy.” He concluded that “unless something is done to correct this growing spirit of discontent, we shall cease to have that cordial support of the citizens who constitute a majority of our fighting forces.” The situation in North Carolina in 1863 was described as “a sense of insecurity which presages an appeal to arms, and the root of the whole matter was a deadly hostility to our cause and our Government.” It was in this year that Vance and Holden parted company. Vance had been brought forward as gubernatorial candidate in 1862, and in 1863 the split came over the issue of the peace meetings. Governor Vance continuing to work for the southern cause and Holden for peace.

Senator Phelan of Mississippi wrote to President Davis, stating that “never did a law meet with more universal odium than the exemption of slave-owners. Its gross injustice is denounced even by those whose position enables them to take advantage of its privileges * * * its influence upon the poor is most calamitous and has awakened a spirit and elicited a discussion of which we may safely predict unfortunate results.”

Deaths. As the summer of 1863 passed, the death lists grew larger. Hardly a household was omitted from the lists. In the North, where there were many families untouched, the situation was different. One writer, in 1863, is forced to cry out, “Our fallen braves how numerous! Among our generals, Zollicoffer, Ben. McCulloh, Albert Sydney Johnson and the saintly, dauntless Stonewall Jackson, are numbered among the dead; while scarcely a household in our land does not mourn the loss of a brave husband and father, son or brother.”

Deaths, military defeats, invasions, destructions of property may cause a great deal of suffering, but as Alexander Stephens said before the Georgia Legislature in 1864, “They

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134 Last Ninety Days of War in North Carolina, pp. 214.
136 Ibid., pp. 182.
137 Life in Dixie, Gay, pp. 21-22.
can do but little toward conquering a people who are determined never to submit.”158 But were the southern people determined? Were they willing to pay the price of independence? Independence and liberty could be gathered only of blood and misery sustained by a devoted patriotism. Governor Vance doubted that they had the willingness to pay the price, but he was determined that “in the tracing of the sad story of the backing down, the self-imposed degradation of a great people, the historian shall not say it was due to the weakness of their Governor, and that Saul was consenting unto their death.”159 In Mississippi, by March, 1864, many who had been bitter secessionists were ready and anxious for peace on any terms.160 Many were willing to leave the Confederacy for the North. This sentiment is expressed by Mrs. Dawson in a Confederate Girl’s Diary, when she paraphrases Hamlet, “To be or not to be, that’s the question. Whether ‘tis nobler in the Confederacy to suffer the pangs of an unappeasable hunger and never-ending trouble, or to take passage to a Yankee port, and there remaining end them.”

Sentiment. The last six months of the Confederacy were months of sham. In May, 1864, General Sherman left Chattanooga for Georgia. Governor Brown issued a series of appeals to Georgians to arise and repel the invaders. They were urged to come in squads or singly, to bring such weapons as they could find and to bushwhack the invaders without mercy.161 Senator Hill of Georgia issued the following appeal: “Every citizen with his gun, and every Negro with his spade and axe, can do the work. Georgians, be firm, act promptly and fear not.” The delegation from Georgia in the Confederate House sent the following message: “Let every man fly to arms—remove provisions and Negroes. Burn all bridges and block up the road in his route. Assail the invader by day and night—let him have no rest.” General Beauregard also sought to arouse the state to its danger. Said he, “Arise for the defense of our native soil! Obstruct and destroy all roads in Sherman’s front, flank and rear, and his army will soon starve in your midst.”162 The Richmond Dispatch reported the response to these appeals. It stated that the planters stayed at home, awaiting the invaders’ approach, “nor did they destroy any property or drive away their cattle.” It concluded that there was but one interpretation, that “confidence in the success of the rebellion no longer exists anywhere outside of the official class and the army.”163 Senator Foote, writing early in 1865, stated that by December, 1864, “to all men in Richmond, the collapse of the Confederate cause appeared inevitable.” Mrs. Chesnut

158 Cleveland, A. H. Stephens, pp. 175.
159 Last Ninety Days, pp. 123-126.
162 Charleston Mercury, November 22, 1864.
163 Richmond Dispatch, February 14, 1865.
wrote in September, 1864, that the end had come—"since Atlanta fell, I have felt as if all were dead within me forever." 164 De Leon wrote in Four Years in Rebel Capitals that the fall of Atlanta was a terrible shock to the people of the South. "A sullen and increasing gloom," said he, "seemed to settle over the majority of the people." Governor Vance was distressed by the situation, as he wrote to a friend, September 22, 1864. "The signs which discourage me more than aught else are the utter demoralization of the people. With a base of communication five hundred miles in Sherman's rear, through our own country, not a bridge has been burned, not a car thrown from its track, not a man shot by the people whose country he has desolated. They seem everywhere to submit when our armies are withdrawn. What does this show, my dear sir? It shows what I have always believed, that the great popular heart is not now and never has been in this war. It was a revolution of the politicians, not the people; and was fought at first by the natural enthusiasm of our young men, and has been kept going by state and sectional pride, assisted by that bitterness of feeling produced by the cruelties and brutalities of the enemy." 165

The newspapers, churches and public officers attempted to bolster up the failing morale. The Richmond Dispatch urged that "we hear no more cries of peace, but let every man make up his mind to war. We have hitherto been extremely averse to regard the war as anything more than a sort of episode in our existence * * * we must give up money-making and devote ourselves to the pursuits that will assist in carrying on the war." 166 After a church service in November, 1864, Mrs. Chesnut commented in her diary, "What a sermon!—there was more exhortation to fight and die, a la Joshua, than much Christianity." 167 In Mississippi, it was said that the summons of brave leaders and patriotic appeals to battle had become as idle as the call of spirits from the vast deep. It was found that only in the ranks of the army did constancy and fidelity linger. With the people the source of sustenance was being gradually limited, the force of resistance had run out, and only the shell was left to offer a short prolongation of what was known to be a futile combat.

George Eggleston, a Confederate private, states that it was impossible to tell precisely when the conviction became general in the South that they were beaten, and yet, he says, "from the beginning of the campaign of 1864, we must have known that the end was approaching and that it could not be other than disastrous." 168 Another declares that the generals at

164 Chesnut, pp. 327.
165 Last Ninety Days, pp. 27-28.
166 Richmond Dispatch, October 18, 1864.
167 Chesnut, pp. 334.
168 Eggleston, pp. 235.
the head of the Southern armies had resigned all hopes of success after the
campaign of 1864 had opened.\textsuperscript{169} Jones, the War Clerk, wrote that in
Richmond, December, 1864, there was deep vexation, "a general appre­
hension that our affairs are rapidly approaching a crisis such as has not
been experienced before * * * men are silent and some are dejected,
and it is unquestionably the darkest period we have yet experienced."\textsuperscript{170}
Judge Hudson, of Leake County, Mississippi, wrote to President Davis,
November, 1864, that in his state there was a general discontent and "a loss
of confidence in the administration and our success, a disposition of opposi­
tion to the powers that be and declarations of reconstruction."\textsuperscript{171} But
President Davis and the civil officials were as defiant as ever. In ad­
dressing Congress, Mr. Davis said that the Confederacy had no vital
points. "If Richmond, Wilmington and Charleston, and Savannah and
Mobile were all captured," said he, "the Confederacy would remain as
defiant as ever, and no peace would be made which did not recognize its
independence."\textsuperscript{172}
As 1865 opened, among many of the people there was an absence of
the enthusiasm of 1861. At Salisbury and Charlotte, North Carolina,
there were two destructive fires which consumed great quantities of stores,
and there was a great freshet on January 10, which carried away bridges,
mills, fences and tore up railroads all through the central part of the state.
Mrs. Spencer, in the Last Ninety Days of the War, declared that these
happenings added to the general gloom and repression, and "that the very
elements seemed to have enlisted against us."\textsuperscript{173} From Georgia, Howell
Cobb wrote that "gloom and despondency rule the hour and bitter opposi­
tion to the administration mingled with dissatisfaction and disloyalty is
manifesting itself."\textsuperscript{174} A correspondent of the Richmond Dispatch, in
January, 1865, told of the contract in Charleston between 1861 and 1865;
that those who were the most furious advocates of secession in 1860, as
well as many of the most confident and resolute supporters of the cause
were now the most despondent; that the city which had been "the cradle
of rebellion and the hot-bed of secession no longer presented the bold front
with which it entered the conflict and the men who would not stop to count
the cost four years ago, and who inaugurated the secession movement,
now hint at another revolution."\textsuperscript{175}
January 21, 1865, Thomas Bocock wrote to President Davis that there
was a rapid change for worse in the public sentiment of the country,

\textsuperscript{169} Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 197.
\textsuperscript{170} Jones, Diary of War Clerk, II, pp. 368.
\textsuperscript{172} Pollard, Last Year of War, 117.
\textsuperscript{173} Last Ninety Days, 29.
\textsuperscript{175} Richmond Dispatch, January 20, 1865.
“not only in other states, but here in our loved and honored Virginia;” and he urged that something should be done “to restore confidence and revive hopes or else we may look for the worse results.” The Confederacy from this period on was slowly tottering to its fall. As one writer interpreted the situation, “the people are not only weary of the war, but they have no longer any faith in the President, his Cabinet, Congress, the Commissaries, Quartermasters, enrolling officers and most of the generals.” Finally he is led to cry out, “God save us! We seem incapable of saving ourselves.”

The recorded instances which show the spirit of the southern people during these months are pathetic. They manifest a gradual loss of faith and confidence in the future. General Lee realized the condition. He wrote to General Wise in February, 1865, “We have strength enough left to win our independence, and we are certain to win it, if the people will not give away to a foolish despair.” A few days before, he had written the same sentiment to W. C. Rives, “If the people will sustain the soldiers and evince the same resolution as the army,” he felt no apprehension about the issue of the contest. Again in March, he wrote to Secretary Breckinridge, “Everything, in my opinion, has depended and still depends upon the disposition and feelings of the people.” Reagan, Postmaster-General, wrote to President Davis, April 22, 1865, “It is also for me to say that much as we have been exhausted in men and resources, I am of the opinion that if our people continue the contest with the spirit which animated them during the first years of the war, our independence might yet be in our reach. But I see no reason to hope for that now.” Confidence was thus rapidly passing away. “Re-establish confidence,” said the Daily South Carolinian, a Columbia weekly, “and our greatest victory is won.”

While much depended upon the people, almost as much depended upon the army. Straggling bodies of Confederate soldiers hurried through North Carolina and Georgia. In some of the armies discipline seemed to have broken down. There were those who saw that subjugation of the South would be a matter of years. The wide territory, if the soldiers could be kept fighting, would make immediate subjugation impossible. Warfare by detached parties who knew the country could have been carried on for years. Small bands of soldiers could have existed where large armies would starve. But the will to fight was gone and the Confederacy was staggering to its grave. Ex-Governor Graham of North Carolina stated that he left Richmond in the evacuation movement, convinced of

176 Jones, II, pp. 391.
177 Richmond Dispatch, February 17, 1865.
178 Ibid., February 9, 1865.
179 Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 204.
180 Daily South Carolinian, February 12, 1865.
three things, (1) that independence for the southern Confederacy was perfectly hopeless, (2) that through the administration of Mr. Davis we could expect no peace, so long as he shall be supplied with the resources of war, and (3) “that it was the duty of the state government to immediately move for the purpose of effecting an adjustment of the quarrel with the United States.”

A few days before General Lee’s surrender, April 1, 1865, Mrs. Andrews wrote in her Diary, “The war is closing in upon us from all sides. I am afraid there are rougher times ahead than we have ever known yet.” On April 18, while in the streets, she learned of rumors of the surrender, and she wrote, “nobody seems to doubt it, and everybody feels ready to give up hope.” When the confirmation of Lee’s surrender was brought, she described the situation in the following words: “There is a complete revolution in public feeling. No more talk about fighting to the last ditch; the last ditch has already been reached; no more talk about help from France and England, but all about emigration to Mexico and Brazil. We are irretrievably ruined.”

Southern Women. Everywhere the men lost their morale sooner than the women. The spirit of the women is one of the marvels of the war. When men were surrendering and advocating union, the women were willing to fight longer. No historian may chronicle the rebellion without noticing the record of the women. How may we explain it? There is first, an inherent spirit of self-sacrifice and of continued devotion in the feminine nature which is not common to the male. The devotion of women to their country is not exceptional. It is common to every nation and every people in their struggles for what seems to be worthy. They have been always the silent power which ruled behind the throne. There was nothing in the fiber of southern women which would make them inherently superior to the women of other ages and sections in the manner in which they bore their privations. If the North had been called upon to make the sacrifices which were demanded of the South, the women of the North would have responded in as noble a manner. In the South, they toiled and they were spinning in their homes, they were nursing in the hospitals, and many wrote bright, cheery letters to the front, and manifested in the hour of trial an undaunted patriotism. It must not be forgotten, however, that a minority differed. As we read some of the letters and diaries, we may understand why so many men became deserters. General Lee complained that many desertions among the North Carolina

181 Last Ninety Days, pp. 137-141.
182 Andrews, Diary, pp. 133-155. These sentiments are directly opposed to the sentiment of Colonel Freemantle, who wrote of his Three Months in the Southern States, in 1863, when he said in speaking of the devotion of the southern population, that the nineteenth century would not witness the destruction of “such a gallant race.”
troops were occasioned by the news from home. There was another type of Southern woman, whom we may parallel in any section and at any period. She was attracted by the advertisements of blockade material for sale. The columns of the newspapers are filled with ads for the attraction of women buyers. Under such a stimulus there were some women who never felt the privations of war.

Here was a group whom the ease and luxury of the slave regime had taught to be ladies, and who with the help of the blockade and of merchants eager for the sale of goods, continued to live their lives of ease with little alteration. These were in the minority, but such a group as we may find in any society. On the other hand there were those who suffered and sacrificed, who offered their hair, their valuables, to be sold for the maintenance of the Confederate finances, and when the war was over, they were as determined as before. A correspondent of the Boston Advertiser was quoted in the Richmond Republic of July, 1865, as saying that the women are more bitter than the men in their feeling toward the North. "The men are deeply mortified," he said, "but seem for the most part to accept their changed condition." As the historian contemplates this situation he may be reminded of the trite adage about convincing a woman against her will. And yet the story of the southern woman in the war is one of the heroic narratives of this history.

The morale of the South, when the war began, was enthusiastic, and the section was fairly united in its objects. The majority opinion was pro-war to 1863. With the defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, there was the beginning of a change. Not an acknowledgement of defeat, but a sullen hope that negotiations and diplomacy might win what the force of arms had not won. The disaffection spread, as we have noted above, through North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama and the lower South. The exemption of slave-owners made the war appear as rich man’s war; the death lists, although received with fortitude, affected the spirit of those at home; the appeals made by governors, President Davis, Congress and public speakers were issued in vain. Throughout 1864, the discontent continues to spread. As 1865 opens many contrasts in the spirit of the people in this last year and in the first year of the war are noted by trustworthy observers. General Lee’s letters show that he realized the importance of popular support. But the South had lost heart, and the acknowledgement of this loss came only in the surrender of General Lee. The army and officers must have known that they were beaten, but determinedly they refused to believe it. It is a wonder that the Confederacy with this divided spirit and these disintegrating forces within, maintained itself as long as it did. If there is any single personality which contributed to this dogged continuance, it was the personality of Jefferson Davis. He refused to believe that he
was beaten, until he was a deserted fugitive. From his mind, the hope of the Confederacy seemed never to fade.

Abandonment of the Slavery Issue. The Confederacy prior to 1865 had been seeking either recognition or intervention from Europe. It was thought that through the need of Europe for the cotton product of the South, recognition or intervention would follow as a matter of course. But the expected cotton famine did not develop, and no European nation had taken up the cause of the South. The existence of the institution of slavery was a hindrance to the spread of sympathy for the Confederacy. This government was standing in the middle of the nineteenth century supporting a feudal and outworn institution. While the rest of the world, including the North, had adopted the modern industrial basis. The nineteenth century was the century of industrial advance. Civilization was taking a forward step, but the South was maintaining and defending a system which pointed backward.

The attitude of England upon this question is shown by a report of Mason, Confederate Commissioner to England, regarding the speeches by Earl Russell, in the House of Lords, as early as March, 1863. A conversation with Lord Donoughmore revealed the fact that Lord Palmerston was probably unwilling to make a treaty with the Confederacy because of the slavery issue. Letters were sent from various sources to President Davis and to Secretary Benjamin, stating that slavery was the great obstacle to recognition.

In the autumn of 1864 Secretary Benjamin informed President Davis that "future negotiations must be on the basis of emancipation and the government seizure of cotton to purchase ships by which to break the blockade." It was decided to send Davis F. Kenner of Louisiana to propose emancipation. After a series of interesting adventures he reached England early in 1865, but it was too late in the war to accomplish any permanent result by this mission.

The failure of such an effort shows how completely the southern organization had collapsed. Although founded on the maintenance of slavery, the Confederacy was now willing to abandon this institution—the cornerstone of its edifice. Thus the "benevolent" institution of slavery was thrown into the discard in the interest of political expediency. From 1865, to the present time, loud and long have been the assertions that "we did not go to war because of slavery"—but the facts speak for themselves. Slavery was defended until hope was all but gone. The South had found that it could not force its feudal principles upon the progressive

182 Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, Callahan, pp. 242-243.
184 Ibid., pp. 244.
185 Ibid., pp. 246.
186 William and Mary College Quarterly, Vol. 25, pp. 9-12.
nineteenth century. It was a vain attempt to lead an advancing political and economic civilization backward.

Another reversal of form is shown in the suggestion for the arming of the Negroes.187 From the first year of the war, Negroes were employed by the Confederates as laborers in the building and repairing of fortifications. In 1864, the Confederate Congress passed a law for the impressment of 20,000 slaves for menial service.188 In the meantime, local combat units of Negroes were organized in Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. In New Orleans one regiment contained 1,100 free colored men. But the Confederate Government refused to adopt this expedient. In November, 1864, J. A. Seddon, the Secretary of War, refused permission to Major Briggs of Columbia, Georgia, to raise a regiment of Negro troops.189 Sentiment was being created, however, in the interest of the arming of the Negroes. The potent argument for it was the difficulty of securing white southerners to enlist and remain in the army. One group of Confederates, of which General Howell Cobb was typical, declared that “the proposition to make soldiers of our slaves is the most pernicious idea that has been suggested since the war began. * * * If slaves make good soldiers, our whole theory of slavery is wrong.” On the contrary, General Pat Cleburne and Secretary Benjamin advocated their enlistment. Sam. Clayton of Georgia, another advocate, declared that “the recruits should come from our Negroes, nowhere else. We should away with false pride and promptly take hold of all the means God has placed within our reach to help us through this struggle—a war for the right of self-government. Some people say Negroes will not fight. I say they will fight. They fought at Ocean Pond (Olustee, Fla.), Honey Hill and other places. The enemy fights us with Negroes and they will do very well to fight the Yankees.”190

In January, 1865, General Lee recommended in strong terms the employment of Negroes. But Congress delayed, the Senate refusing in February to call on the Committee on Military Affairs to report a bill. Finally after recommendations from General Lee, Governor Smith of Virginia, the Virginia Assembly and President Davis, an act was passed by the Confederate Congress, March 13, 1865, to enroll 300,000 Negroes in the armed forces of the Confederacy. Efforts were made to put the law into operation. Recruiting officers were appointed in each state, and preparations were made for their entrance into the army.191 The Richmond Dispatch,
March 25, 1865, in noting the accessions to the Negro regiment, remarked that "the cause is progressing." But the Charleston Mercury concluded more wisely, that "the experiment will simply take two hundred thousand good muskets out of the Confederacy, two hundred thousand good corn producers out of the field, every one of whom is needed, and will place two hundred thousand Negro troops already armed and drilled in the Yankee army."

The adoption of this project for the use of Negroes as soldiers shows the complete extent of the collapse. The heart of the South was no longer in its struggle. Intent on winning, the leaders were willing to accept any expedient; even to reverse themselves on the theories upon which the Confederate Government had predicated its existence. Moreover, unwilling to fight themselves—for there were thousands of deserters in the South—they would now thrust their slaves to the front to fight for them.

Since the Civil War, southern writers and sympathizers have been declaring that the causes of the Confederate failure in its war for independence were the overwhelming numbers in northern armies, the scarcity of food, men, materials, the blockade or the errors of its leadership. It would seem that the truth as revealed by the facts should now be known without fear of sectional animosity. Leaving aside military defeats, the collapse of the South was due in part to a lack of resources, but more directly to a lack of a wholehearted and sustained resistance, a complete renunciation of self, an unequalled support of its government’s measures, a devoted and continued loyalty to its declared principles, without which no revolution has been successful. The Confederacy’s championship of a cause and a system which was outworn was also a powerful element in its fall. The Industrial Revolution in Europe had proclaimed a new economic system, which was making a rapid advance in America. The political revolutions of 1818, although unsuccessful, had been pointing to a forward movement in the political freedom of the working man. The Confederacy, surrounded by destructive forces, working without and within, met the only climax which was humanly possible for it. Pressed by a mightier military opponent, discounted by foreign powers and overwhelmed by its own weaknesses, the Confederacy passed away.

No single factor which has been noted above may explain—by itself—the collapse of the Confederacy. Each one is contributory to the result. It has been shown,

(1) That the resources of the Confederacy were sufficient for its necessary demands, but that these resources were either inadequately distributed or that they were interfered with by advancing Federal troops—a superior military organization. This apparent lack of resources contributed to the collapse, but the claims of some writers that these were the great causes of the Confederate collapse must be revised;

(2) That the lack of a co-operative endeavor between the President,
Cabinet, Congress and state leaders contributed to the decline of the popular support of the war; and

That the morale of the Confederacy, from the autumn of 1864, was steadily declining. In spite of the appeals of the Confederate leaders, the popular support of the war decreased. General Lee realized the significance of this loss, but the great heart of the South with the opening of 1865 was no longer in the struggle. Of the factors contributing to the collapse, the psychological factor of morale was one of the most influential. In the interest of historical truth, these factors must be considered.