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War, Peace, and Culture In American-East Asian Relations

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18 **By Akira Iriye**

The key question facing mankind today is that of war and peace. The superpowers possess between them an arsenal of nuclear weapons sufficient to destroy the entire globe, and other nations are also intent upon acquiring and improving their nuclear capabilities. Still others, while not nuclear powers themselves, have been earmarking larger and larger portions of their budgets for increased armament.

The traffic in arms has been such that the flow of weapons from advanced to Third World countries has constituted a larger and larger share of the entire trade of the world. It is as if mankind had a death wish, fascinated by the prospect of self-destruction.

As nations pile up military arms and spend vast sums on improving technology for mass killing, their internal political systems have also tended to become more militarized. Hitler's statement (soon after his accession to power) that "the main principle must be everything for the armed forces," sounds less shocking today than in 1933, as country after country has concentrated on building up larger and more expensive forces, creating a close relationship among business, industry, education, politics, and the military establishment in which boundaries between private and public sectors and between peacetime and war-related pursuits have become blurred.

Indeed, one wonders if this is an age of peace or of war. Peace is presented as a prelude to, preparation for, or meaningful only in terms of, war. One is reminded of the dictum in George Orwell's *1984* that "war is peace." In many countries today, the Orwellian phenomenon seems fast becoming a reality in which "double-think" is enforced in order to keep the people in a constant state of war preparedness.

If this is the tragic condition of mankind today, I am afraid that Japanese, Chinese and Americans have had their share in varying degrees in contributing

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to it. Any discussion of American-East Asian relations in the 20th century would have to start by recognizing this fact. First of all, however one views the rise of Japan as a modernized nation since the late 19th century, there is little doubt that this signalled the emergence of a military power in Asia which caused other countries to respond in kind. Japan's victory over China in 1894-1895 forced the Chinese to undertake military modernization, while 10 years later its defeat of the Russian navy had the effect of making Japanese power supreme in the western Pacific. This caused Britain to entrust the defense of its Asian empire to Japan while it concentrated its fleet west of India, in turn exacerbating the naval rivalry with Germany.

The United States, in the meantime, undertook a spectacular expansion of its navy in the Pacific in the wake of the conquest of the Philippines and the annexation of Hawaii, and in response to the rise of Japanese naval power. The Japanese and the Americans never got over the sense of naval confrontation across the

Pacific till they came to open blows in the 1940s.

The Pacific Ocean belied its name in the 20th century; it became an arena where the two navies vied with each other for greater power, forcing their respective governments to spend large sums on ships and sailors. The burden was particularly crushing on Japan, the less developed of the two, as increased armament meant higher taxes and brought about the intrusion of the military into politics. This was most notable in the decade of the 1930s, which opened with the navy-inspired assassinations and plots to overthrow civilian government.

The army, on its part, sought to enhance its own position *vis-à-vis* the navy by similarly intervening in politics and calling for the building of a huge continental empire, which would bring more funds to the army.

It was no accident that the Manchurian incident of 1931, involving a premeditated attack on China's northeastern provinces, was followed immediately by the downfall of party government in




ILLUSTRATION BY MARTIN INMAN

Japan and its replacement by cabinets that did little more than take orders from the military.

Military spending claimed larger and larger shares of the national budget until, on the eve of the American war in 1941, almost 90 percent of the budget went to armament. The production of consumer goods was discouraged, and under the slogan of "national mobilization," all available manpower was incorporated into a rigid system for war and war-related services. Yet few people, even in the military, knew what the war was all about. Fighting came to be its own justification; it was a war for war's sake. In order to justify it, the government resorted to massive propaganda. Echoing Orwell's "double-think," the aggression in China was called a sacred struggle for East Asian culture — as if the effects of atrocities and brutalities could somehow be mitigated if they were called cultural pursuits.

In retrospect, what is most appalling is the way in which at first a few, then more, and eventually the bulk of Japanese intel-

lectuals — academics, journalists, teachers, writers — came to echo such nonsense. Even highly respected scholars with advanced degrees from the world's best universities began mouthing "double-think" slogans without realizing there were merely slogans. Their country's militarization had caused their minds and hearts to become militarized, and they could not think of themselves, their country, and the world in any other fashion.

It was because of this very thorough militarization that when Japan's military machine was ruthlessly crushed by American, Chinese, and other countries' forces, its political institutions, economic organizations, and minds were also demilitarized. In 1945, with the military empire in ruins, the only alternative was to accept demilitarization and start building a differently oriented society.

The passion with which Japan's politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals embraced the vision of what they called "the nation of culture" rather than of arms, reveals their disillusionment with militari-

zation and war. Because the modern Japanese state had been virtually synonymous with war and war preparedness, it is not surprising that even the sense of nationhood was lacking in Japan for a long time after its defeat.

If a new national consciousness were to be generated, it would have to be rooted in a totally new definition of the country's objectives and orientations. The postwar constitution, renouncing war and stressing the people's right to well-being, embodied that definition.

Today, nearly 40 years after the defeat, there are indications that the pendulum is about to swing again so that Japan may once more orient its economy and politics toward war-making. Already the country's military expenditures are the seventh largest in the non-communist world, and there are pressures for further increasing them. Some even call for a nuclear arsenal. Unless the trend is reversed or moderated, we may soon see Japan's re-emergence as a major military power in Asia, and a consequent militarization of society. Instead of being a manufacturer and exporter of consumer goods, a society in which only one percent of the national income is spent on armament, the country may turn into an exporter of arms, one in which the arms industry provides the engine of technological progress and economic gain.

It would be simple if we were able to trace the wars and militaristic tendencies of 20th century Asia to just one source, Japan. Unfortunately, Japanese militarism has not been the exception, but merely an extreme form of a more general phenomenon. The United States, and China as well, have contributed to militarizing their societies and the Asia-Pacific region.

Historians trace the origins of the so-called "military-industrial complex" in the United States to World War II, when close cooperation developed between private industry and the military establishment, under the supervision of the government. The cooperation resulted in the creation of the world's mightiest military power, which

20 was perpetuated after the war. Even when postwar American policy called for demobilization and withdrawal of forces from Europe, it may be recalled, there was no thought of dismantling the naval and air bases in the Pacific, including those in the Philippines and Japan.

The armed forces of the United States were involved in the governing of Japan, Okinawa, and South Korea, and just as steps began to be taken to reduce their size, the North Korean invasion of the South brought about a decisive military response. The United States would retain its military presence in the western Pacific and on the continent of Asia to preserve the status quo. It would keep Taiwan separate from China. It would ally itself with Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and other non-communist countries of Asia so that they might constitute a military bloc to obstruct Chinese and Soviet expansion.

The strategy led inexorably to American involvement in Southeast Asia, reaching a climax during 1965-1969 when more than one million American troops fought against the Vietnamese. That war came to an end in 1975, but this has not meant America's military withdrawal from Asia. The stress since the late 1960s has been on United States naval and air power, combined with a new relationship with the People's Republic of China as well as Japan, so as to match the Soviet Union's growing naval presence in the area.

In all this seemingly endless arms race, there was a time, during the 1970s, when American leaders and public opinion favored a rapprochement with Russia. They spoke confidently of the end of the Cold War and the coming of an era of competitive cooperation between the two military giants. Today, however, the stress is once again on confrontation, necessitating the diversion of larger and larger shares of the national income to arms buildup.

China, too, has developed as an ever greater military power. The country's military modernization started on the eve of the Republican revolution of 1911, but unfortunately its armed forces spent much of

the next several decades fighting against one another rather than becoming unified against an external enemy. Even so, the vision of a strong China served to give hope to a people devastated by internal strife and foreign aggression. As Chiang Kai-shek said during the war, China would ultimately emerge as one of the global powers and would contribute to preserving the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region after Japan's defeat.

Such a vision ensured that once China expelled Japan, its leaders would be those who had trained themselves as military strategists and officers. Here Chiang Kai-shek and his allies were unable to retain their power as they were opposed by exponents of "people's war," those who made no distinction between regulars and militia or between war and peace. Constant struggle was a way of life for the communists, and perpetual revolution their doctrine.

In practice, the Chinese communists were extremely cautious in dealing with their neighbors, and they never wanted a frontal war either with the United States or the Soviet Union. Still, they have not abandoned the concept of a global coalition of Third World countries against the superpowers, nor failed to include military modernization as one of the cardinal goals of the party.

The Chinese have been eager to develop their own nuclear capabilities, and have earmarked a large portion of their foreign exchange for purchasing arms from America and Europe. China's controlled press extols the virtues of the Red Army, and its educational policy emphasizes technical skills useful for further military modernization.

The Soviet Union, too, is a military power in Asia as well as in Europe. Like Meiji Japan and Communist China, Soviet Russia has developed as a militarily defined country. Leninist conceptions of the state and the world stressed that there could never be true and stable peace until all countries became socialist. But while the early Bolsheviks were not entirely

committed to the traditional practices of power politics, viewing them as a relic of the bourgeois past, Stalin and his followers embraced them eagerly, believing that the cardinal goal of the Soviet state must be its military strengthening. Ideology or economic development was secondary to that objective, and since the 1930s the Russian leaders have concentrated on heavy industry and armament expansion, in the process creating a huge military establishment which regularly demands a larger share of the budget.

The Soviet Union is thus primarily a military power, not an ideological movement, and as such its moves have been responded to by its neighbors, including the United States, in similarly military fashion. The Russian people are taught to extol the virtues of the country's military greatness and to look with suspicion at the military programs and strategies of all other countries.

Everything the Soviet Union has done is justified as having been the only correct course of action; evil motives and sinister designs are attributed to the actions of other countries. Such indoctrination is necessary to justify military spending and to enable the leaders to remain in power.

In this fashion, Asia—no less than other parts of the world—has been an arena of intense armament rivalry, balance-of-power politics, and militarization in the 20th century. Millions have died in war—not just Asians but Americans, Russians, and Europeans. While Japan, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union have not been engaged in war for some time, other countries continue to conduct small-scale fighting.

We can view all these phenomena cynically, or even philosophically, and say that wars never cease because of a fundamental distrust among peoples and countries. Despite all the accumulated wisdom about causes of war, it has not been possible to go beyond the ancient Chinese Legalist view that lack of trust in each other is a basic human condition, and that statecraft must be built on that

assumption. Even in as optimistic a society as America, we recall George Washington declaring (in the farewell address) that one should never base a country's foreign policy on the trustworthiness of other nations. This view, which in the modern world was most clearly formulated by Thomas Hobbes, postulates that because human nature is basically evil, war is a permanent, normal condition of life. Peace is merely a temporary absence of war. A country, even if it is at peace, must be prepared for the next war.

"Willingness to fight is itself evidence of a society's maturity..."

In 18th century Europe such thinking was reinforced by scientific rationalism so that warfare and war preparedness came to take on aspects of modern science in which "rational" considerations would enable statesmen to conduct successful diplomacy and warfare. The 19th century added to the equation the Clausewitzian dictum that war is an extension of politics by other means, that is, that external warfare and internal political arrangements are two sides of the same coin. If a country is to be successful in war, it must have a domestic political structure commensurate with the task. Conversely, once a war has begun, it must be conducted, and ended, in such a way as to strengthen the polity.

If Clausewitz's strategic thought was the 19th century's gift to mankind, the 20th century added its own contributions. Modern biology and anthropology proposed theories of human evolution and societal progress in such a way as to popularize the notion of survival of the fittest. War, in such conceptualization, is seen as an engine of progress; it is only through fighting, anthropologists and historians pointed out, that a society or race learns to organize itself effectively and marshal all its resources for the collective endeavor. Willingness to fight is itself evidence of a society's maturity, and its suc-

cess in war attests to its ability to improve technology and organization. Only those societies and races, writers pointed out, that had successfully waged wars had survived into the 20th century, while others had long died, declined, and atrophied.

While the naive racism of some of the earlier biological theories has been rejected, and while the biologically-grounded survival-of-the-fittest concept has been largely discredited, these theories have been followed by a more nationalistic idea of struggle for survival, a zero-sum game in which a country's gain in armament or the global balance of power is seen as another's loss.

All these ideas, from the ancient times to the 20th century, indicate that man's view of himself and his fellows has not changed significantly in the last several millennia. So long as such ideas are accepted by men, governments will have little difficulty in orienting their countries toward armament and war. While a concern with nuclear armament has made people throughout the world focus on the possibilities and dangers of a nuclear holocaust, we should realize that atomic warfare is only an extreme expression of a more pervasive phenomenon, and that at bottom lies what would appear to be the unchanging human condition: one's distrust of other human beings and willingness to destroy them before one is destroyed.

This is a very gloomy picture. If that is all there is to what I have called the human condition, we would all have to brace ourselves for further intensification of war preparedness, armament rivalry, and totalitarian control, resulting in many more wars and even in the final nuclear war that could destroy the world. If such were the case, all countries would become garrison states, in a constant state of readiness for war, where governmental and non-governmental activities would be geared toward enhancing national power. In such a situation, as George Orwell so graphically described in *1984*, all efforts

would look to the near future, to preparedness for the next war. That preoccupation would determine how people should be governed, how they should train for fighting, what should happen to family life, and even what people should know. For they should know only what would prepare the state most effectively for war. They should be concerned with the present and near future. They should not remember the past, lest their memory interfere with their mental preparation for the future. Memory, in fact, is non-existent in the world of "1984."

It seems to me that this is the most frightening aspect of the totalitarian state that Orwell describes, and may have already become a reality in some parts of the world. To control, alter, or wipe out memory through state intervention is to create a non-thinking human automaton who is not constrained by a remembrance of things past and who is thus capable of detaching himself from all emotion and consciousness.

Luckily, we have not yet lost our memory, and it seems to me that our consciousness of the past does give us some hope for the future. We remember not just Japanese aggression in China, Pearl Harbor, atomic bombings, or Vietnam, but are also aware of another set of historical experiences in the annals of American-Asian relations. We recall periods of peace that were much more than mere interludes between wars; we remember individual Americans, Chinese, and Japanese whose primary interest was trade, not war, and others who established schools and hospitals abroad; and we note that millions of Americans and Asians learned about one another through paintings, novels, music, and films.

To ignore this record is to wipe out an essential aspect of the history of American-East Asian relations; and to say that these activities had no meaning except as obscure footnotes in the annals of modern diplomacy and warfare is to deny the reality of individual human endeavors

22 and interests. To be cynical about the record of private, individual activities is to run counter to the observed fact that even in strictly regimented authoritarian societies it has not been possible to exterminate a person's private as against communal self.

Because many of these activities can be broadly construed as cultural, we may refer to this category of American-Asian relations as cultural interchanges. The duality of the history — on the one hand the story of war and diplomacy, and on the other that of cultural exchange — is nowhere more strikingly illustrated than in the record of American-Japanese relations. At one level, this record consists of the two countries' power confrontation and war, as already sketched. At another level, one notices that there has been a consistent pattern of the Americanization of Japanese culture.

As early as the first Meiji years, more Japanese students were sent to the United States to study than to any other country. The trend has continued to this day virtually uninterrupted. Of the nearly 15,000 Japanese students abroad, two-thirds are now in America. Conversely, since the late 19th century, more Americans than others have gone to Japan as teachers and missionaries.

While there have been more Asian, particularly Chinese, than American students in Japan, the number of American students has increased considerably in recent years. In 1980, out of the total of 6,500 students from abroad, 550 came from the United States. Of course, this represents a tiny fragment of the population of either Japan or America. Even today, there are only some 125,000 Japanese visitors temporarily in the United States as students, tourists or businessmen, while the number of Americans in Japan (about 23,000) is even smaller. But this kind of human exchange often has an influence quite out of proportion to its size. For instance, women's education in modern Japan has been, from the beginning, promoted and influ-

enced by American educators. Modern Japan's women's history can never be written without taking into account the ideas and practices brought into Japan by American missionaries and other educators, a significant number of them women.

"The Japanese cultural experience was significantly affected by the encounter with American civilization...."

Japanese students in America, on their part, learned modern science, technology, social sciences, and literature in colleges and universities, and then returned home to write about them. Already, at the beginning of the 20th century, they were publishing accounts of such topics as the philosophy of William James, the managerial theories of Frederick W. Taylor, the historical interpretations of Frederick Jackson Turner, the novels by contemporary American writers, and even the operas being performed at the Met.

These instances, it is true, were not exactly exchanges in the sense of a two-way traffic of influences. The exchange was overwhelmingly uni-directional, and has remained so to this day. The fact remains that the Japanese cultural experience was significantly affected by the encounter with aspects of American civilization, and that individual Japanese came to internalize American scholarly, literary, or artistic developments. Their view of their own culture was broadened, so that what was taking place across the Pacific was no longer an alien development of no interest to Japan, but came to constitute a vital part of their experience.

The transformation reached a climax during the 1920s when observers noted that Japanese culture was fast becoming Americanized. This could best be seen in popular and material culture, such as Hollywood films, the radio, jazz music, and baseball, but the phenomenon also included a growing interest in American history and politics, which even brought

about a rising popularity of American democracy as the wave of the future.

This sense of affinity, even approximation, with American culture was not reciprocated in the United States, where the 1920s saw the enactment of an immigration law excluding Japanese, and where scare stories about a possible war with Japan were popular. Still, we must recall that there were other developments, such as the establishment of the American Council of Learned Societies, one of whose first projects was to promote the study of East Asian culture and history, and the organization of the Institute of Pacific Relations, devoted to an educated dialogue across the Pacific.

The 1920s also saw the beginnings of Japanese studies programs at a small number of universities. Unknown to contemporaries, these modest beginnings were paving the way for the future growth of Japanese studies in the United States. It is good to remember, too, that American scholars, journalists, and other writers at that time were going through a skeptical, even pessimistic phase about the unity of knowledge or about the superiority of modern Western culture. They were trying to grapple with disturbing questions that arose from the experiences of the Great War and its aftermath, which seemed to indicate that something was wrong with the confident, progressivist view of Western civilization that had been prevalent earlier. Among other things, such skepticism inspired fresh studies of other civilizations and races, and more tolerant views of them were emerging by the early 1930s.

Unfortunately, such developments in Japan and the United States did not prevent the diplomatic crisis and confrontation in the 1930s, leading ultimately to war in 1941. If we assume that Japan in 1930 was more Americanized than ever before, and that the United States was likewise becoming more interested in and tolerant of Japanese culture, we must also accept that such cultural interactions were powerless to avoid the Pacific crisis.

Despite their increasing cultural Americanization, the Japanese cheered their army as it conquered one Chinese province after another, and if they felt a contradiction between these two, they sought to cope with it by de-Americanizing their lives. Throughout the 1930s, governmental spokesmen and publicists exhorted the people to shed Western influences and to construct a more indigenously based culture. Culture, in such a context, instead of suggesting a cosmopolitan outlook and friendly interactions with other countries, was politicized and became a handmaiden of aggressive foreign policy.

In the United States, too, cultural nationalism rather than cosmopolitanism reemerged, the more so as there grew a siege mentality, tormented domestically by the Depression and externally by the aggressive behavior of other countries. Interest in cultural exchange was subordinated to the need to reaffirm the strength of American civilization. Here, too, culture became an instrument of foreign policy, as exemplified by the establishment of the Office of Cultural Affairs in the Department of State in the late 1930s.

Japanese behavior in the 1930s may indicate that when a country decides on the pursuit of power and the use of force abroad, its cultural activities are either irrelevant or become incorporated into national policy and thus lose their autonomy. Certainly, it is a justified indictment of Japanese intellectuals, educators, artists, journalists, and others that they failed to safeguard their cultural freedom but became willing tools of the state. Yet it would be wrong to say that they completely ceased to be interested in cultural exchange. As late as 1941, such instances of American culture as movies, jazz music, and baseball were popular in Japan, and American literary as well as scholarly writings continued to be avidly read. Perhaps more important, in the context of our discussion of historical memory as an insurer of freedom, the Japanese, even as they

committed atrocities on the continent and shouted patriotic slogans at home, retained vivid memories of the 1920s when the country's politics, society, and culture had been much more tolerant and cosmopolitan. These memories would serve them well once the nation lost the war. They were not sufficient to stem the tide of aggressive war, but without them the subsequent history of Japanese-American relations would have been very different.

Something analogous may be said about the situation in the United States. The Japanese crisis and eventual war abetted an emotional, often hysterical response to everything Japanese; Japanese art objects were destroyed and Japanese residents incarcerated. Here, too, however, scholarly interest in Japan never disappeared. On the contrary, it grew during the period. Japanese language training was expanded, and as many as 39 doctoral dissertations dealing with Japan were written during 1941-1945.

It is easy to dismiss these efforts as war-related; it was necessary to train Japan specialists in order to interrogate prisoners of war or to prepare for the occupation of the country. But these activities were buttressed by a view of the 1920s that corresponded to Japanese perceptions. Americans, just like Japanese, remembered the decade as having been one of cooperation and cultural exchange between the two peoples.

So long as the experiences of the 1920s were remembered, it was easy for Americans to conceive of postwar relations with Japan in a framework other than that of purely punitive occupation. It was for this reason that American officials and scholarly advisers during the war laid much more stress on educational reform, rather than on the punishment of war criminals, which would be necessary in Japan after its defeat. Japanese education was once again to be made more cosmopolitan, oriented toward peaceful pursuits of cultural objectives.

Peace, culture, and cosmopolitanism

— these themes were written into the postwar Japanese constitution, and have been identified by the Japanese themselves as the mainstay of their postwar history. But all these themes have had a strongly American connotation. It has been a peace sustained by the American-initiated postwar constitution and by a security treaty with the United States. Japan's postwar culture has been very cosmopolitan, but American influence has been predominant.

The Japanese picked up their cultural pursuits where they had left them in the 1930s to resume the process of Americanization begun earlier. The process was vastly facilitated by the influx of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and sailors, and by the fact that contact with other countries was virtually non-existent in the early postwar years. It is also noteworthy that even before 1952, when the peace treaty went into effect formally ending the state of war between Japan and the United States, the latter invited more than 800 Japanese students to study in institutions of higher learning. The trend was accelerated after 1952, and altogether some 3,000 Japanese were enrolled in American colleges and universities throughout the '50s.

Most of these students were in their teens and twenties, and their experiences in American society in the 1950s were to have a profound impact on Japanese politics, business, and culture. Today these men and women are in their forties and fifties, occupying key positions in government, industry, journalism, and academic life. It would be no exaggeration to say that they have contributed substantially to the creation of postwar Japanese consciousness and continue to orient Japanese society and culture along cosmopolitan, in particular American, ways.

If these men and women represent Japan's elites, the masses, too, have come under American influence to a far greater extent than before the war. Many of them have visited the United States as tourists.

24 Others became acquainted with American culture through imported foods and fashions, through American movies which represent nearly one-half of all foreign films shown in Japan, or through visiting American artists, tourists, and students.

There has also been a reciprocal phenomenon. Although one cannot speak of the Japanization of American life to the same extent as the Americanization of Japanese life, statistics indicate that already during the 1950s more than 300 American scholars visited Japan, and a somewhat larger number of doctoral dissertations were written dealing wholly or in part with Japan. The trend accelerated in the 1960s, and by 1970 there were more than 400 Japan specialists in American colleges and universities, where some 6,600 students were taking Japanese-language courses.

For the bulk of Americans, Japan would still remain a distant, linguistically inaccessible culture, but they, too, must have become steadily aware of Japan through its cameras, transistor radios, cars and other products. Statistics indicate that during the 1970s, an average of 15 million Americans annually travelled overseas, of whom more than 60,000, or four-tenths of one percent, went to Japan. This represents a far smaller proportion than Japanese tourists, of whom about 18 percent visited Hawaii and the continental United States. Even so, the fact that as many as 600,000 Americans crossed the Pacific in the decade as temporary visitors seems impressive.

More recently, there has been a qualitative change in the types of Americans in Japan. Besides tourists and students, professional people such as businessmen and lawyers as well as artists of all kinds have been to the country in connection with their professional pursuits. Japan has become part of their spheres of action, not a quaint civilization, but simply another society where it is possible to engage in business, intellectual and cultural pursuits without a sense either of superiority or defensiveness.

“American-Japanese cultural relations are but one example . . . of the ways in which people of diverse historical backgrounds have come into closer contact with one another. . . .”

What the record indicates is a steady expansion of the mental universes and perceived realities of both Americans and Japanese over the last several decades. Not all these developments have been products of pleasant memories or friendly intentions; for most people over the age of fifty, the last war may still be the point of departure as they think about American-Japanese relations, and for younger people affected by trade and other disputes, the framework in which they comprehend these relations may be that of economic competition and potential conflict. Nevertheless, one ignores other phenomena at the risk of distorting some important patterns in American-Japanese relations, and in 20th century history in general. For one could find a similar record, although varied in diversity and intensity, of cultural interactions between Americans and other Asians and indeed with all other people.

American-Japanese cultural relations are but one example, perhaps the most notable, of the ways in which people of diverse historical backgrounds have come into closer contact with one another, either directly through personal travels and activities abroad or indirectly through books, newspapers, films, or art exhibits. This, it seems to me, is one legacy that the 20th century can bestow upon future generations. The century has not been a very happy one in the annals of mankind, but at least it has shown that it is possible for individual men and women of all societies to broaden their mental horizons through increasing contact.

Of course, increasing contact does not necessarily bring about peace and friendship. On the contrary, it may give

rise to tensions and confirm preconceived prejudices about one another. We are all too aware of the fact that technological innovations since the 19th century, which narrowed distances between countries, were paralleled by the growth of exclusive nationalistic sentiments, which created a psychological readiness to destroy one another. It is precisely because of these gloomy realities that one appreciates the efforts of individuals here and abroad who have refused to succumb to excessive nationalism or to resign themselves to becoming passive agents of state power, giving up all ideas of autonomy and freedom.

If indeed the overwhelming trend of modern world history has been toward greater and greater armament and toward the aggrandizement of state power at the expense of personal liberties, cross-cultural pursuits by private individuals take on added significance as they give hope that not everything is inevitably leading toward war and destruction.

To the extent that Americans and Asians, coming from distinct traditions and histories, have been open to mutual influences and engaged in intellectual, artistic, and educational exchanges, they have contributed to asserting the cause of cultural internationalism and freedom, which ultimately provide the foundations of peace. They have demonstrated that all individuals are at least potential partners in this task. The world's peaceful future may well depend upon them.

In considering what is left of the 20th century — indeed, what is left of the history of mankind — it may be hoped that all of us who are committed to the survival of freedom will intensify our cultural endeavors in a self-conscious pursuit of open-mindedness and mutual understanding. □

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